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English Summary
English Summary
The regulatory approach to supply security in electricity markets has been
substantially altered since power markets were partly privatized and re-
regulated in the mid 1990’s, when regulators chose to rely on market based
prices and decentralized commercially based decisions on generation capac-
ities. Prior to this market restructuring power systems basically worked as
planned economies, however, the decentralization of production decisions in-
troduced stochastic elements to electricity systems.
Additionally, since the early 2000’s, power generating companies, often
incentivized by the state, started increasing the share of renewable but inter-
mittent energy sources in their generation portfolios. Due to its intermittency
the production process of wind, solar and hydro power is diﬃcult to plan and
therefore the ﬁnal amount of power that enters the market at each point in
time becomes diﬃcult to predict. As the level of power supply intermittency
increases, so also do the number of challenges that market based approaches
face in organizing secure power systems.
How markets should be organized in order to eﬀectively signal capacity
scarcity and ensure a secure supply of energy is frequently debated, all the
more so since the advent of renewable energy sources. This dissertation adds
to this discussion of market design and supply security in power markets. It
consists of three chapters that aim to understand the economics of supply
security in electricity markets.
The ﬁrst chapter asks to what extent a duopolistic power market can solve
eﬃciency and supply security requirements. I show that in a duopoly market
the wholesale auction is characterized by prices above marginal costs and
that blackout probabilities can arise through capacity withholding rather
than capacity scarcity. In equilibrium, one larger ﬁrm prices higher and
sells power at the margin, while the smaller ﬁrm bids lower energy prices
and withholds capacity. Only the larger ﬁrm has an incentive to maintain
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English Summary
balanced grids and supply all stochastic demand. The smaller ﬁrm, if not too
small and not withholding capacity, risks blackouts when maximizing proﬁts.
When the system operator faces high demand that leads to a shortage of
supply, and thus has to buy more energy, the smaller ﬁrm then becomes a
monopolist for out of market purchases.
Then I analyze how markets can be designed to incentivize energy pro-
duction, support secure supply and minimize blackouts through bid based
capacity remuneration mechanisms. When regulators implement capacity
remuneration mechanisms, available peak capacity increases, however only if
capacity is remunerated above its marginal costs of being available. In that
case, capacity mechanisms lower blackout probabilities and energy prices,
but increase energy price volatility. I ﬁnd that energy price caps reduce price
volatility without eﬀecting system security in the short run. Hence, energy
price caps and capacity mechanisms can mitigate market power in the energy
market, but at high costs for available peak capacity. The choice of market
design depends on regulatory preferences for supply security. That is, on how
much costs regulators are willing to spend for secure supply and on how far
regulators are willing to administer capacity mechanisms that distort energy
price signals in the long run.
The second chapter analyzes how smart metering, that allows for real-
time pricing of ﬁnal consumers, can soften the market design problem as
discussed in the ﬁrst chapter, and increase market eﬃciency. The focus
of the analysis lies on welfare eﬀects of smart metering when consumers
are risk-averse and generating ﬁrms have market power. Whether real-time
pricing enhances welfare depends on the ﬁrms’ capacities, the magnitude of
the demand shock and on the proportion of consumers on real-time pricing
schemes. With large ﬁrm capacities that always lead to perfect competition,
there is no diﬀerence in welfare when all or no consumers are on real-time
pricing. When ﬁrms’ capacities are smaller such that market power arises,
ﬁrms can price relatively high in times of high demand shocks. When this
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is the case, real-time pricing decreases consumer surplus, because risk-averse
consumers dislike high and uncertain prices. At the same time real-time
pricing increases producer surplus, because more wholesale customers pay a
real-time price above marginal costs. In this case, the social welfare eﬀect
of real-time pricing hence depends on the magnitude of these two opposing
eﬀects. If however ﬁrms’ capacities are relatively large and the demand shock
does not change the wholesale price, smart metering can increase consumer
surplus and welfare. These ﬁndings suggest that, before investing in smart
meters and smart grids, aggregate market capacities, dominant ﬁrm behavior,
and the welfare gain of insuring against price ﬂuctuations through ﬁxed retail
prices should be taken into consideration.
The last chapter takes the market design discussion to data. I develop
a simple multiunit uniform price auction model and apply it to data from
capacity auctions in the New York electricity market. The results show that
the simple model describes the behavior in the auction to a high degree. As
predicted by the model, the largest bidder submits the clearing price in each
auction. In this way the ﬁrms co-ordinate on an equilibrium that extracts
high rents from the auctioneer. Where observed bids violated the model and
could have proﬁtably been undercut by the pivotal ﬁrm, bidders seem to learn
over time. A majority of bids that according to the model could have been
proﬁtably underbid were submitted in the ﬁrst ﬁve auctions, and the mag-
nitude of non-optimal bids decreases thereafter. Small ﬁrms adjusted their
bids according to the largest ﬁrm’s proﬁts of undercutting, thereby making
undercutting not proﬁtable. During the period studied from 2003 to 2008,
the capacity market in New York City did not clear as intended by the system
operator and was rewarding capacity at too high prices. Capacity remuner-
ation mechanisms, if designed in the form of the capacity auctions studied
here, are a costly tool to promote supply security and supply adequacy in
electricity markets.
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Den lovgivningsmæssige tilgang til sikkerhed i enerigforsyningen er blevet
væsentligt ændret, siden energimarkedet blev delvist privatiseret og dereg-
uleret i midten af 1990’erne. Myndighederne introducerede markedsbaserede
priser og forretningsbeslutninger vedrørende produktionskapacitet blev de-
centraliseret. Mens energisystemer forud for omstruktureringen af markedet
stort set fungerede som en planøkonomi, tilfører decentraliserede produk-
tionsbeslutninger et stokastisk element til el- forsyningssystemer.
Primært motiveret af staten er energiforsyningsvirksomheder siden starten
af nullerne ogs˚abegyndt at integrere en stigende andel af vedvarende men
intermitterende energi i deres portefølje. Produktionen af solenergi, vind- og
vandkraft er vanskelig at planlægge, og dermed bliver den mængde energi, der
kommer ind p˚amarkedet p˚aethvert tidspunkt, svær at forudsige. P˚agrund af
diskontinuiteten i energiforsyningen møder ogs˚aden markedsbaserede tilgang
til at organisere sikker energiforsyning nye udfordringer.
Det er blevet diskuteret gentagne gange, hvordan markeder skal organ-
iseres for at sikre en sikker energiforsyning, men særligt siden indførelsen
af vedvarende energikilder. Denne afhandling bidrager til diskussionen af
markedsdesign og forsyningssikkerhed p˚aelmarkeder. Den best˚ar af tre ar-
tikler, der sigter p˚aat forst˚ade økonomiske aspekter af forsyningssikkerheden
p˚aelmarkeder.
Den første artikel stiller spørgsma˚lstegn ved, i hvor stort et omfang et
duopolistisk energimarked kan løse eﬀektivitets og forsyningssikkerhedsmæs-
sige behov. Jeg p˚aviser, at en gros marked p˚aet duopolt marked er karak-
teriseret ved priser over marginalomkostningerne, og at risikoen for strøm-
afbrydelse kan opst˚ap˚abaggrund af tilbageholdenhed snarere end p˚agrund
af mangel p˚akapacitet. I ligevægt prissætter en større virksomhed energi
højere og sælger energi p˚amarginen, mens de mindre ﬁrmaer tilbyder lavere
energipriser og tilbageholder kapacitet. En større virksomhed har incitament
vi
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til at opretholde et balanceret net og levere til al stokastisk efterspørgsel.
En mindre virksomhed, hvis den da ikke er for lille og ikke tilbageholder
kapacitet, risikerer strømafbrydelser ved proﬁtmaksimering.
Efterfølgende analyserer jeg, hvordan markederne kan designes for at
tilskynde energiproduktion, fremme forsyningssikkerhed og minimere strøm-
afbrydelser gennem et kapacitetsmarked. Hvis myndighederne indfører et ka-
pacitetsmarked, øges den tilgængelig kapacitet ved spidsbelastning, dog kun
hvis kapaciteten belønnes udover den marginale omkostninger ved at være til
r˚adighed. I s˚afald sænker kapacitetsmarkedet risikoen for strømafbrydelse,
men øger energiprisernes udsving. Jeg mener, at et loft over energipriser re-
ducerer prisudsving uden at p˚avirke systemets sikkerhed p˚akort sigt. S˚aledes
kan prislofter p˚aenergi og kapacitetsmekanismer afbøde markedskræfterne
p˚aenergimarkedet, men med høje omkostninger for den tilgængelige kapacitet
ved spidsbelastning. Valget af markedsdesign afhænger af lovgivningsmæs-
sige præferencer for forsyningssikkerheden, dvs. af hvor meget lovgiverne er
villige til at ofre p˚aat sikre forsyningen og af, hvorvidt lovgiverne er villige
til at administrere kapacitetsmekanismer, der forvrider energipris i det lange
løb.
Den anden artikel analyserer, hvordan smart meter, der giver mulighed for
real-time prisfastsættelse til forbrugere, kan blødgøre problemet i markeds-
designet som omtalt i den første artikel og øge markedets eﬀektivitet. Fokus
i analysen ligger p˚avirkningerne p˚avelfærd af intelligent m˚aling, n˚ar for-
brugerne er risikoaverse og producerende virksomheder har markedsmagten.
Hvorvidt real-time prisfastsættelse øger velfærd afhænger af virksomhedernes
kapacitet, omfanget af efterspørgslen og p˚amængden af forbrugere p˚asmart
meters. Med store kapaciteter, der altid fører til fuldkommen konkurrence,
er der ingen forskel i velfærd, n˚ar alle eller ingen forbrugere er p˚areal-time
priser. N˚ar virksomhedernes kapacitet er mindre, som energimarkedet viser,
kan virksomheder sætte prisen relativt højt i tider med høj efterspørgsel.
Hvis dette er tilfældet, sænker real-time priserne nytten for forbrugerne, fordi
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risikoaverse forbrugere ikke bryder sig om høje og usikre priser. Samtidigt
øger real- time priserne producentoverskuddet, fordi ﬂere engroskunder be-
taler en real-time pris, der ligger over marginalomkostningerne. I dette til-
fælde afhænger eﬀekterne af real-time prissætning p˚avelfærden af omfanget af
disse to modsatrettede eﬀekter. Hvis virksomhedernes kapacitet derimod er
relativt stor og efterspørgsel ikke ændrer engrosprisen, kan smart meters øge
forbrugernes overskud og velfærd. Resultaterne tyder p˚a, at man, før man
investerer i at smart meters, skal tage den generelle tilstand af markedet, dvs.
samler markedskapaciteten dominerende virksomheders adfærd, og velfærd-
seﬀekten af sikrede priser i betragtning.
Den sidste artikel viderefører diskussionen af markedsdesign til data.
Jeg udvikler en enkel multiunit uniform prisauktionsmodel og anvender den
p˚adata fra New York ISO kapacitetsauktioner. Resultaterne viser, at denne
simple model i høj grad beskriver opførslen p˚aauktionen. Som forudsagt
af modellen, vil udbyderen af den største mængde af kapacitet fastsætter
markedsprisen i enhver auktion. P˚adenne m˚ade koordinerer virksomheder
ud fra en ligevægt, som trækker høj proﬁt fra auktionarius. Byderne synes
at lære med tiden, n˚ar det drejer sig om observerede bud, der overtr˚adte mod-
ellen og med proﬁt kunne være blevet underbudt af en stor virksomhed. Et
ﬂertal af bud, der ifølge modellen med proﬁt kunne være blevet underbudt,
blev fremlagt i de første fem auktion runder, og omfanget af ikke-optimale
bud falder derefter. Mindre virksomheder reagerede p˚ade største virksomhe-
dens proﬁt og deres fortjeneste ved underbud ved at justere sine egne bud.
I løbet af den undersøgte periode fra 2003 til 2008 blev kapacitet belønnet
med alt for høje priser. Kapacitetsmarkedet er ikke velegnet til at fremme
forsyningssikkerheden og sikre tilstrækkeligt udbud p˚aelmarkeder, hvis den
er designet som de kapacitetsauktioner, der er undersøgt i denne afhandling.
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Introduction
The regulatory approach to supply security in electricity markets has been
substantially altered since power markets were partly privatized and re-
regulated in the mid 1990’s, when regulators chose to rely on market based
prices and decentralized commercially based decisions on generation capac-
ities. Prior to this market restructuring power systems basically worked as
planned economies, however, the decentralization of production decisions in-
troduced stochastic elements to electricity systems.
Additionally, since the early 2000’s, power generating companies, often
incentivized by the state, started increasing the share of renewable but inter-
mittent energy sources in their generation portfolios. Due to its intermittency
the production process of wind, solar and hydro power is diﬃcult to plan and
therefore the ﬁnal amount of power that enters the market at each point in
time becomes diﬃcult to predict. As the level of power supply intermittency
increases, so also do the number of challenges that market based approaches
face in organizing secure power systems.
How markets should be organized in order to eﬀectively signal capacity
scarcity and ensure a secure supply of energy is frequently debated, all the
more so since the advent of renewable energy sources. This dissertation adds
to this discussion of market design and supply security in power markets. It
consists of three chapters that aim to understand the economics of supply
security in electricity markets.
The International Energy Agency ﬁnds energy supply to be secure if it
is adequate, aﬀordable and reliable.1 Adequacy, aﬀordability and reliability
imply a relatively large production at low costs, a relatively low market
price, and a low price variance, respectively. Reliability in electricity markets
however imposes an additional requirement that is foreign to the standard
1See The International Energy Agency (2007).
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economic idea of relative scarcities. Blackouts, a binary state of the world,
have to be avoided - but at what price? Blackouts occur and cause signiﬁcant
economic damage.2
The following three chapters analyze supply security in electricity markets
in terms of prices and output, but also in terms of reserve margins and
blackout probabilities, and costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent means to alter them.
The overarching goal of this thesis is to ask to what degree markets can ensure
a secure supply of energy, how markets can be designed to enhance secure
supply, and how technological improvements such as smart metering and
smart grids can shift the frontier to a more eﬃcient and reliable use of power
generating resources.
Beyond the scope of this thesis are economic and political developments
that shape the primary energy markets. The technology mix of energy
sources will be taken as given.3 Currently, the technology mix is changing
in favor of an increased use of intermittent renewable energy sources. The
resulting relation between stochastic supply and demand constitutes a start-
ing point for this thesis. As for instance plans to rely on a market share of
around 50% wind energy in the Danish market by 2025 show, the integration
of intermittent renewable power indeed comes with signiﬁcant challenges for
power systems.4 Throughout this thesis the term energy market, or some-
times power market, will always refer to the commodity electricity. I mostly
focus on the generation level, but also include downstream levels and con-
sider retailers and ﬁnal customers. Transmission constraints in the power
grid are neglected.
Energy markets are characterized by only a few players on the supply
side. Production decisions and market prices are determined by the game
2See The International Energy Agency (2005).
3For an overview and measurement of external supply risks see Le Coq and Paltseva
(2009).
4See Xu et al. (2009).
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of dominant ﬁrms who face stochastic demand and hence uncertain proﬁts.
To account for the strategic interaction among producers all three chapters
rely on industrial organization models and apply them to electricity markets.
Why are standard industry models not suﬃcient to describe electricity mar-
kets? Electricity is not storable on a large scale and in an economically viable
way. The non-storability results in various constraints that all players in the
market - ﬁrms, consumers and regulators alike - have to take into account.
Non-storability requires eﬃcient market clearing and a balance between
supply and demand at each point in time. Neither excess demand nor excess
production should occur to not waste surplus or proﬁts.5 Non-storability also
implies that consumers cannot smooth consumption over time and their de-
mand becomes highly inelastic. Inelastic and stochastic demand leads to high
price ﬂuctuations. Electricity prices are high and transmission constraints
possibly binding, when consumers need electricity the most, say for cooking
dinner. The problem of instantaneous market clearing gets further aggra-
vated by the fact that in current electricity markets most consumers cannot
observe and react to price signals. The absence of a robust demand side is
a central ﬂaw in electricity markets. This market ﬂaw also requires that,
after forward markets close, the system operator has to act as an agent for
all market players and buy or sell electricity to clear the market and balance
the grid in real-time.
Hence while decentralized decisions to produce power with intermittent
technologies result in uncertain supply, non-storability is the major source
of randomness on the demand side. Therefore all three following chapters
5Supply has to equal demand also due to engineering constraints. In most parts of
the world including Europe the grid frequency has to be close to 50 Hertz. In US power
systems 60 Hertz are required for grid stability. When demand is larger than supply and
more power leaves than enters the grid, the frequency drops, while if supply is larger
than demand the frequency rises. By common standards, system operators have to keep
deviations between ± 0.8 Hertz. Hence for economic eﬃciency but also due to engineering
constraints supply has to equal demand at all time. Note that storability would solve both
the economic and the engineering constraint.
3
Introduction
share a common modeling framework that incorporates stochastic demand
and supply.6
The ﬁrst chapter derives to what extent market mechanisms alone can
ensure a secure supply of energy. Starting from this benchmark I then show
how and at what costs diﬀerent market designs can promote supply security.
The second chapter analyzes how smart metering can ease the market design
problem and increase market eﬃciency. The focus of the analysis lies on wel-
fare eﬀects of smart metering when consumers are risk-averse and generating
ﬁrms have market power. While these ﬁrst two chapters are of theoretical
nature, the third chapter eventually takes the market design discussion to
data and investigates the eﬃciency of market designs for reliability using
data from the New York electricity market. Besides contributing with em-
pirical insights, the last chapter also conﬁrms the modeling framework that
is used throughout this thesis to describe strategic ﬁrm behavior.
References
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in Imperfect Power Markets
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Abstract
This paper studies supply security in imperfect electricity markets.
In a multiunit uniform price auction for electricity with two ﬁrms,
strategic ﬁrm behavior allows for endogenous blackout probabilities,
that arise through capacity withholding rather than capacity scarcity.
When regulators impose market designs for reliability and introduce
capacity obligations or reserve capacity procurement, blackout prob-
abilities and energy prices decrease only if the capacity price is above
marginal costs. Capacity mechanisms can mitigate market power in
the energy market, but at the cost of non-competitive capacity prices
and increased energy price volatility.
Keywords: Auctions, Electricity, Market Design.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: D43, D44, L11, L13
aCopenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelanshaven 16 A, DK-
2000 Frederiksberg, e-mail: ses.eco@cbs.dk
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1 Introduction
During the 1990’s most industrialized countries deregulated their electric-
ity sector and introduced a more decentralized approach to supply security.
Energy regulators and academics have ever since been debating the extent
to which liberalized power markets can ensure a secure supply of energy.
Large-scale blackouts during the last decade, as for example the substantial
supply breakdowns in Europe and North America in 2003, stress this de-
bate’s relevance.1 In recent years, the advent of renewable but intermittent
power sources like wind has increased the uncertainty in production plan-
ning and highlighted the need for a functioning power market design even
further. Well functioning power markets ensure market eﬃciency but also
meet desired supply security standards.2
The regulatory debate over supply security resulted in a variety of dif-
ferent market designs across power systems. Although market designs diﬀer,
virtually all electricity markets face problems arising through market power.
The relation between market power and supply security, and how market
design aﬀects this relation, is largely unexplored. Surprisingly, while a huge
strand of literature deals with market power in power markets, most contri-
butions on supply security focus on competitive markets.
This paper contributes by exploring the eﬀects of market design on sup-
ply security in imperfect power markets. It analyses the two main competing
power market design tracks: the energy-only market and the capacity market
design. While in England and Wales or in Scandinavia energy-only markets
exist, in a majority of U.S. markets regulators rely on various forms of ca-
pacity mechanisms.3 Energy-only markets rely on high peak-time prices to
induce suﬃcient investment. The capacity market design introduces price
1See The International Energy Agency (2005).
2See The International Energy Agency (2007).
3For brief overviews of international market designs see Stoft (2002) and Sioshansi and
Pfaﬀenberger (2006).
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caps to lower the energy price spikes for consumers. In addition, regulators
implement capacity mechanisms, that reward available generation capacity
regardless of whether they actually produce energy or not. In an ideal world,
capacity mechanisms generate rents that level out the missing revenues that
result from the price cap in the energy market, while at the same time reduc-
ing market power and price volatility. In the US the discussion on market
design centers around market power and price risks. In the EU the increasing
use of intermittent power sources like wind energy has drawn attention on
optimal market design considerations.4
Previous contributions to the relation of market design and supply secu-
rity led to ambiguous conclusions. Hogan (2005) argues in favor of energy-
only markets. He states that arguments in favor of capacity mechanisms
merely assume that pure energy-only markets are politically not feasible as
they allow for high price spikes. Also Oren (2000) ﬁnds that capacity mech-
anisms are the least desirable tool to enhance power market reliability. He
concludes that risk management and price hedging tools, including demand
side participation, yield eﬃcient investment. On the contrary, Cramton and
Stoft (2005) argue that capacity markets, if well designed, hedge energy mar-
ket risk, suppress market power and avoid regulatory risk. In this regard also
Besser et al. (2002) ﬁnd that capacity markets lower peak-time prices and
decrease price and reliability risks for consumers.5 Joskow and Tirole (2007)
ﬁrst derive optimal prices, output and investment in competitive power mar-
kets and then show how this optimum can be reached under oligopoly com-
petition with price caps and capacity payments. Creti and Fabra (2007)
4As more intermittent wind energy enters the power system, the demand for peaking
units and hence the proﬁtability of investment in peak capacities becomes more diﬃcult
to predict. Capacity markets could restore incentives for peak production, see Eurelectric
(2011).
5Note that such arguments for capacity markets diﬀer from those for standard forward
markets derived by Allaz and Villa (1993), whose setting also is not directly applicable
to the capacity market context. While in their standard setting the same commodity
is traded in the forward and in the spot market, on capacity markets the commodity is
capacity itself instead of energy that eventually is traded in real-time.
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explicitly model capacity markets and focus on the monopoly and the com-
petitive case, deriving the opportunity costs of committing capacity to the
home market instead of selling it to foreign markets.
Motivated by the fact that most electricity markets are oligopoly or
duopoly markets, this paper introduces dominant ﬁrm behavior on both the
energy and the capacity market and to this end relies on a duopoly auction
framework. As in Creti and Fabra (2007) production capacities are given,
and the focus lies on ﬁrms’ optimal behavior and equilibrium outcomes that
decide on short run supply security, rather than on optimal investment in
capacities and system adequacy.6 The main goal of this paper is to ask to
what extent markets can ensure a secure supply of energy and how market
designs for reliability eﬀect equilibrium outcomes in generation capacities,
market prices and blackout probabilities when generating ﬁrms have market
power.
Main ﬁndings are that for a range of asymmetric ﬁrm sizes, energy-only
markets can cover the full support of stochastic energy demand. However if
ﬁrms are suﬃciently similar in size, capacity withholding becomes attractive
and may lead to blackouts. In both cases equilibrium energy prices exceed
marginal costs. Capacity mechanisms can decrease energy prices and black-
out probabilities, but require that capacity is paid above marginal costs.
Hence, when ﬁrms behave strategically, consumers can only ’buy supply se-
curity’ from dominant ﬁrms. This contradicts the perception shared in Besser
et al. (2002) that capacity mechanisms are a costless tool to decrease market
power during peak times. Furthermore, capacity markets only decrease en-
ergy price volatility if they coincide with the implementation of energy price
caps.7 If no energy price cap is introduced, capacity markets increase the
6For deﬁnitions on supply security and supply adequacy see Stoft (2002). Market de-
signs with short run capacity mechanisms, that directly aﬀect energy market competition,
are currently run in the New York control area, and until recently have also been used in
the PJM market, as described in Creti and Fabra (2007).
7Tishler et al. (2008) present a similar argument and ﬁnd that capacity expansion due
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volatility of energy prices because more capacity commitment may result in
lower prices but at the same time does not prevent high energy prices. An-
other surprising result is that system security, that is the relation of demand
to total market capacity, is independent of the price cap for energy, because
capacity withholding only depends on each competitor’s oﬀered quantity but
not on the level of the price cap. Hence, energy price caps together with
capacity mechanisms can mitigate market power in the energy market, but
imply that generating ﬁrms therefore earn high rents on the capacity market.
The model is based on the electricity auction framework of Fabra et al.
(2006) and introduces the possibility of a blackout. Fabra et al. (2006) allow
for consumer rationing, which results in capacity reaction functions that
do not yield closed form solutions. Including the possibility of blackouts
allows for closed-form solutions and hence for deriving statements on blackout
probabilities and the impact of capacity markets on ﬁrm individual energy
supply, system security and welfare.
The outline is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy stylizes the energy-only market
and the capacity market approach and compares the two opposing market
designs. Section 3 presents a simple duopoly model for energy-only markets
and derives energy prices, equilibrium capacities and blackout-probabilities.
Section 4 analyses the capacity market approach by deriving the capacity
market equilibrium and examining its impact on the energy market outcome.
Section 5 draws relevant policy implications and concludes.
2 The market design problem
In energy-only markets, energy is traded. High demand induces high and
volatile price spikes that signal proﬁtability of new power plants. In addition,
to a higher number of ﬁrms in the market will not decrease price spikes.
9
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high prices encourage the demand side to consume less power during peak-
times.8
In the capacity market approach, energy-only markets are price-capped
and backed up by reliability mechanisms. Energy and capacity are rewarded.9
The price cap lowers the energy price (volatility). However, to maintain
suﬃcient energy supply despite the price cap, the regulator or the system
operator (SO) sets a critical required capacity level that has to be available
in real-time. There are at least two ways of implementing such regulatory
driven capacity decisions. One option for the SO is to procure reserve ca-
pacity so that the desired amount of real-time capacity is reached, like in
the reserve procurement auctions in the Californian system. Alternatively,
the SO can introduce capacity obligations on retailers, like in the PJM or
the New York ISO capacity market. If generation capacity is scarce, such
reliability mechanisms generate extra rents that in the ideal case level out all
forgone peak-unit proﬁts when market prices are capped and in an energy-
only market would be above the price cap. Capacity that is contracted in
the capacity market is rewarded regardless of whether these units actually
produce energy or not. However, rewarded capacity commits to be available
in real-time and thus becomes a relevant strategic variable for the real-time
market. Hence, the regulatory rationale of capacity mechanisms lies in abol-
ishing market power and high energy price spikes via energy price caps, and
securing suﬃcient generation capacity at the same time via rewarding idle
peak capacities on secondary markets.10
8High prices can ﬂatten demand ﬂuctuations if consumers are able to react to real-time
prices. Therefore an argument in favor of energy-only markets, that is not studied here,
is that they induce demand side learning.
9For an overview of reliability mechanisms see Batlle et al. (2007). For a general
overview of electricity market structure see Wilson (2002).
10Power demand is highly volatile and suﬃcient reserve capacity has to be ready for
dispatch at any point in time to cover all real-time demand. When supply cannot meet
demand, consumers have to be rationed and, in the worst case, the system breaks down.
Therefore markets for capacity serve a dual purpose. They reward generation capacity
and ensure instantaneously balanced grids at the same time, see also Stoft (2002).
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Although capacity markets in practice are more elaborate than described
above, their existence always distorts the real-time energy price and inﬂu-
ences all forward contracting and day ahead markets. The market outcome
becomes inﬂuenced by the SO’s decision on the available capacity require-
ment. Reserve capacity, whether procured by the SO or set in obligations,
usually lies in the range of 10-20% of peak load.11
3 The energy-only benchmark
The model for the energy-only benchmark employs an auction approach and
relies on Harbord and Von der Fehr (1993), Fabra et al. (2006) and Fabra
et al. (2011). Related works in this tradition include LeCoq (2002) and
Crampes and Creti (2005) on capacity withholding, and Boom (2009) on
vertical integration.
3.1 Basic setup
Supply security is relevant in real-time. In real-time, supply has to meet de-
mand in order to maintain a balanced power system. This is the SO’s respon-
sibility, who acts as a single buyer and auctioneer in the real-time market.
All ﬁrms can submit supply bids for real-time energy to the SO. Naturally all
bids have to be submitted before real-time. In most power systems real-time
markets open after the wholesale market clears and a few hours before actual
delivery. Before the realization of actual real-time demand is known, each
11See Stoft (2002) and Borenstein (2005). Note that the term reserve markets often
refers to systems in which the SO buys reserves of 10-20% on top of what is contracted
in the day-ahead market, while in the standard capacity market concept the SO obliges
retailers to procure reserves. Hence retailers, depending on the system, have to purchase
between 110-120% of their individual forecasted peak-load. The model abstracts from
whether reserve capacities are procured by the SO or by retailers and analyzes the general
impact of market based capacity remunarations.
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generating ﬁrm submits a quantity-price pair for electricity to the SO that
speciﬁes how much power a ﬁrm is willing to sell at or above a certain price.
Real-time energy demand is stochastic and completely inelastic. Let θ
denote real-time energy demand and be uniformly distributed on the unit
interval, θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] = [0, 1].12 Whenever realized real-time demand θ∗ exceeds
real-time supply, the grid breaks down.13 The supply side consists of two
generating companies, i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. Both ﬁrms submit one energy
bid bi for all capacity they oﬀer, ki. They simultaneously submit their bid
(bi, ki) to the SO.
14 The model focuses on a high demand regime. In this
setting, both ﬁrms’ capacities are needed to cover the full support of demand
uncertainty. More precise, capacity endowments (i.e. residual capacities from
the wholesale and forward market commitment) are such that k¯i + k¯j = T ≤
θ¯ holds, where k¯i is each ﬁrms’ maximum available capacity and T total
available market capacity.15 Marginal costs are assumed to be constant and
normalized to zero.
The SO clears all bids and organizes the dispatch. Thereby the realization
of real-time demand, θ∗, determines the real-time market price according to
a uniform price auction. Relatively low demand will lead to a price equal to
the low price bid. If demand is higher than the low bidder’s oﬀered capacity,
the high price bid becomes price setting. If demand is higher than total
available capacity the system breaks down and proﬁts become zero.16 In the
stylized example in ﬁgure 1, ﬁrm i’s bid is setting the price for low demand
12In Appendix A.3 I relax the assumption on the uniformly distributed demand and
show that the energy market outcome also holds in a more general setting.
13At ﬁrst some consumers would be rationed and a complete blackout avoided. However,
when supply is far too low to meet demand, grids break down. I focus on this latter case.
14Fabra et al. (2006) show that the equilibrium outcome is independent of the number
of steps in the bid function.
15This high demand respectively low capacity setting neglects global subgame perfect-
ness in capacity decisions in that ﬁrms might also invest so that k¯i + k¯j ≥ θ¯ holds, but is
convenient for analyzing supply security in peak times when generation capacity is scarce.
16Fabra et al. (2011) ﬁnd that in the case where ﬁrms can cover the maximum demand
realization and blackouts never occur, no closed form solutions in capacity decisions exist.
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
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bj
bi
θ′ θ′′ 1ki kj + ki θ∗
Figure 1: Stylized Real-time Market.
realizations, θ
′
. If demand is higher than ﬁrm i’s oﬀered capacity, at θ
′′
, the
bid of ﬁrm j clears the auction. For demand realizations larger than total
oﬀered capacity the market does not clear and the system breaks down. The
real-time market price prt can be written as
prt =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
bi = min{b1, b2} if θ∗ ≤ ki
max{b1, b2} if θ∗ ≥ ki
0 if θ∗ ≥ ki + kj,
(1)
where the price of electricity is zero during blackouts.17 There exists a real-
time market price cap P rt, at which the SO stops procuring energy.18
17A price of zero reﬂects the price producers obtain during a blackout. For consumers,
the price is inﬁnite.
18It is important to note that in practice the SO acts as an agent for all buyers and
decides on a price cap, equal to the value of lost load. At this price, the loss of a blackout
is lower than the price of procuring real-time energy. When this price is set at the value
of lost load, it rather imitates a reservation price than it is a regulatory price cap. This
artiﬁcial reservation price is an important feature of energy-only markets, not readily
measurable and diﬃcult to implement in practice.
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3.2 Energy pricing
The low bidding ﬁrm is the ﬁrst to sell. For all demand realizations lower than
its oﬀered capacity, it supplies energy according to its own price-bid. The
high price bidder is called and clears the auction only in case real-time energy
demand is higher than what the low bidder oﬀers. In this event the auction
clearing price equals the bid of the high bidder, who supplies the residual
demand that the low bidder leaves unsatisﬁed. The demand uncertainty
causes conﬂicting incentives for each bidder. For high demand states in which
no ﬁrm can satisfy all demand, each bidder wants to bid suﬃciently low to
induce the opponent not to underbid but to supply all residual demand at
the price cap. However, if a ﬁrm bids low and the demand realization is lower
than its oﬀered capacity, its own bid becomes the clearing price and each ﬁrm
would like to price high in that event. These two conﬂicting forces destroy
pure strategy equilibria, see Fabra et al. (2011). Appendix A.1 presents a
proof for the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria when ﬁrms collect zero
proﬁts during blackouts.
Mixed strategies follow ﬁrm i’s maximization of its expected energy mar-
ket proﬁts
E[πei ] =
∫ bi
b
bi
(∫ ki+kj
kj
(θ − kj)dθ +
∫ 1
ki+kj
0dθ
)
fj(bj)dbj+
+
∫ P rt
bi
(
bi
∫ ki
0
θdθ + bj
∫ ki+kj
ki
kidθ +
∫ 1
ki+kj
0dθ
)
fj(bj)dbj,
(2)
where b is the lowest price in the support of each ﬁrms’ mixed strategy. The
ﬁrst term represents all cases where ﬁrm i is undercut by ﬁrm j. In that event
ﬁrm i can satisfy the expected residual demand at its own bid in case the
demand is suﬃciently high. The second term shows the case where ﬁrm i is
the low bidder and either sells at its own bid or at its competitor’s bid, if the
latter becomes price setting for high demand realizations. Both respective
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last terms in the two brackets state the probability of a system breakdown.
If demand is higher than total capacity, proﬁts become zero. Rearranging
the ﬁrst order condition yields ﬁrms’ cumulative density functions of their
mixed strategy price bids:
Fi(bi, ki, kj) =
kj
2ki
log
(
bi
b
)
Fj(bj, ki, kj) =
ki
2kj
log
(
bj
b
) (3)
where without any loss of generality ki ≤ kj, ﬁrm i oﬀers less or equal capacity
than ﬁrm j, and in equilibrium the lowest bid in the support of the ﬁrms’
bid strategies is
b = e
− 2ki
kj P rt. (4)
For a complete derivation see Appendix A.2. Note that both ﬁrms’ price
strategies coincide for symmetric capacity oﬀers. For asymmetric capacities,
ki ≤ kj, ﬁrm j that oﬀers a larger amount of capacity prices stochastically
higher. The large ﬁrm has a masspoint at the price cap and therefore submits
a bid equal to the price cap with positive probability. This result, which is in
line with previous ﬁndings of Fabra et al. (2011), is summarized in proposition
1.
Proposition 1 In the real-time energy market, the ﬁrm with the greater
capacity oﬀer plays the price cap with a positive probability and submits higher
prices with greater probability than the ﬁrm with a lower oﬀer of generating
capacity. The lowest price bid in the support of each ﬁrm’s price strategy is
positive and above marginal costs.
Proof. See the argument above in equation (3) and Appendix A.2. 
The source of this market power are ﬁrms’ capacity constraints. If both
ﬁrms could cover the whole market demand on their own, the equilibrium
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would be the Bertrand outcome and prices would equal marginal costs. Just
as under Edgeworth competition the capacity constraints allow prices to be
above marginal costs. Expected energy market proﬁts, again for ki ≤ kj,
become
E[πei (ki, kj)] =
(
ki + 2kj − 2k
2
i
kj
)
ki
2
P rt (5)
and
E[πej (kj)] =
k2j
2
P rt. (6)
Proﬁts of ﬁrm j with the larger oﬀer of capacity are strictly increasing in
its oﬀered real-time energy. Firm i that oﬀers less capacity however, has
concave proﬁts. Its proﬁts are ﬁrst increasing in its capacity until it becomes
too big and the ﬁrm with the larger oﬀer relaxes its high price policy and
starts pricing more aggressively. When this price eﬀect is outweighing the
eﬀects of additional capacity, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm with the smaller oﬀer
decrease again. Note that generators cumulative rents become bigger the
more asymmetric their oﬀered capacities are.
3.3 Equilibrium market supply
Given the above derived mixed price strategies, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts
and choose their optimal supply oﬀers. The ﬁrst order conditions of each
ﬁrm’s proﬁt function, given that ki ≤ kj, ki ≤ k¯i and kj ≤ k¯j, imply
∂πej (kj)
∂kj
= kjP
rt > 0 (7)
∂πei (ki, kj)
∂ki
=
(
ki + kj − 3k
2
i
kj
)
P rt. (8)
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Firm j always supplies up to its maximum available capacity, since the ﬁrst
order condition is strictly positive. Thus the optimal supply of ﬁrm j is
k∗j = k¯j (9)
and independent of player i’s capacity. On the contrary, ﬁrm i’s best response
function depends on player j’s oﬀered supply. At the same time ﬁrm i is
possibly binded by its capacity constraint, k¯i. Hence ﬁrm i oﬀers
k∗i = min
{
k¯i, ki(k¯j) =
1
6
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)}
. (10)
Proposition 2 In the energy market equilibrium, two ﬁrms oﬀer asymmet-
ric capacities. The ﬁrm that oﬀers more capacity submits all its available
capacity. The ﬁrm that oﬀers less capacity withholds capacity to be optimal
against the larger bidder’s available capacity, if not binded by its capacity
constraint before reaching the optimal oﬀer.
Proof. See equations (9) and (10) above. 
Equilibrium market shares are asymmetric. The small bidder has an op-
timal supply, that trades-oﬀ gains by rising capacity and losses of becoming
bigger and facing more aggressive price bids of its competitor. If the ca-
pacity constraint becomes binding before the small bidder reaches its proﬁt
maximum, it oﬀers to supply up to its capacity constraint. The ﬁrm with
the larger capacity oﬀer does not gain proﬁts by capacity withholding and
supplies its maximum capacity. For equilibrium proﬁts see Appendix A.4.
The expected equilibrium real-time energy market price is
E[pe] = (ki + kj)
((
3
2
− ki
kj
)
P rt − 1
2
b
)
. (11)
It is important to discuss that the small ﬁrm’s capacity withholding re-
sults from the fact that the demand realization is not known prior to real-
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time energy trading. The result that capacity withholding can take place
shows that the market alone cannot ensure balanced grids at all demand re-
alizations. What is not modeled here is that the SO when observing excess
demand can refer to out of market operations and call energy from the with-
holding ﬁrm. Out of market operations then, however, would leave the small
ﬁrm in a monopoly situation and weaken the signaling eﬀect of the real-time
price even further.
So far the model does not specify which ﬁrm is the withholding ﬁrm in
equilibrium. The potential existence of two equilibria in supply oﬀers - each
ﬁrm can be the small bidder given that its rival submits the larger supply
oﬀer - does not allow for stating unique blackout probabilities.
3.4 Equilibrium selection and blackout probabilities
This section abstracts from technical network blackouts and considers black-
outs that arise through the inability of power supply to meet real-time de-
mand, as derived above. Total market supply and hence the ability to satisfy
real-time load is the sum of both ﬁrms equilibrium capacities. For conve-
nience, let us in the following distinguish between the small (large) ﬁrm,
which is the ﬁrm with the small (large) capacity endowment, k¯i, and the
small (large) bidder, which is the ﬁrm that in equilibrium bids the smaller
(larger) amount of capacity, ki. Without loss of generality we continue for
the case in which ﬁrm j is the large ﬁrm, thus for k¯i < k¯j. For analytical
purposes we can separate two cases. Both lead to the same result: The small
ﬁrm bids the smaller amount of capacity, see equation (9), and the larger
ﬁrm becomes the large bidder, and thus, according to equation (10), oﬀers
all its available capacity.
The ﬁrst of the two cases comprises all combinations of capacity endow-
ments, such that the large ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to withhold capac-
ities and become the small bidder. Intuitively, the large ﬁrm is too big to
18
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become the small bidder. An extreme illustration for this intuition is that a
monopolist would still price close to the monopoly price if an inﬁnitesimal
small ﬁrm would enter the market and bid a low price. As long as
k¯j >
√
19 + 13
√
13
54
k¯i ≈ 1.1k¯i, (12)
the larger ﬁrm j’s proﬁts are strictly higher when being the large bidder.
Hence, for all capacity endowments that fulﬁll equation (12) only one equi-
librium exists, in which the larger ﬁrm submits the larger amount of capacity
and the small ﬁrm becomes the small bidder. For a derivation of equation
(12) see Appendix A.5.
In the second case, whenever equation (12) does not hold and ﬁrms are
of suﬃciently similar size, two equilibria exist. Both ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to be the small bidder, given that their rival submits the large capacity oﬀer.
However, the equilibrium in which the large ﬁrm becomes the large bidder
and the small ﬁrm is the small bidder risk dominates the equilibrium in which
the larger ﬁrm is the small bidder, see Appendix A.5.
Eventually, in both cases, whether capacity stocks fulﬁll equation (12),
or they do not and risk-dominance is applied, the larger ﬁrm will oﬀer more
capacity on the real-time market than its rival. This is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 The ﬁrm with the smaller capacity endowment, k¯i, oﬀers
the smaller amount of equilibrium capacity ki. The ﬁrm that enters the real-
time market with a greater capacity endowment, k¯j, submits all its capacity
kj = k¯j.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings that Wolfram (1998)
presents on the spot market competition in the England and Wales pool.
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Figure 2: Capacity reaction functions for k¯i < k¯j.
Furthermore, this result can explain why it is the larger ﬁrm that also submits
the larger amount of capacity and prices higher than the smaller ﬁrm.
Figure 2 plots equilibrium supply, depending on capacity endowments and
given that both ﬁrms select the risk dominant equilibrium if two equilibria
exist. For suﬃciently asymmetric capacity endowments both ﬁrms supply
their maximum capacity. For capacity endowments that are suﬃciently sim-
ilar, the small ﬁrm reduces its capacity and the large ﬁrm cannot ﬁll this
gap, e.g. for initial endowments of [k′i, k
′
j] ﬁrm i’s optimal oﬀer in this il-
lustration is k′∗i . Demand can exceed all supply oﬀers in the energy market
and, with the uniform demand distribution and θ¯ = 1, there is a probability
of an endogenous blackout of k′i − k′∗i . The small ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to
reduce its capacity, even though this leads to positive blackout probabilities,
as described in equation (13). Blackout probabilities, denoted by β, become
β =
{
1− k¯j − k¯i if k¯i ≤ 16
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)
1− 1
6
(
7 +
√
13
)
k¯j else.
(13)
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Blackout probabilities are exogenous for k¯i ≤ 16
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)
: Both ﬁrms
are capacity constrained, cannot cover the full support of demand realiza-
tions, and blackouts can occur. For k¯i >
1
6
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)
, blackouts are at
least partly endogenous and arise through capacity withholding: Even if total
available capacity could cover the complete support of demand uncertainty,
the small ﬁrm will withhold capacity. It is striking that the price cap for
energy does not play a role in determining system security.19 The price cap
only determines ﬁrms proﬁts, thus long run investment and system adequacy,
but not system security. Short run withholding is independent of the price
cap, because the small ﬁrm’s supply oﬀer reacts to the larger ﬁrm’s capac-
ity, but not to the price cap. Blackout probabilities depend on the relative
capacity constraints, with which the ﬁrms enter the real-time market.
Last, the derived pricing strategies and capacity choices also shed light
on the nature of supply security, which often is referred to as being a public
good, see for instance Abbott (2001). Starting from the simple observation
that a monopolist ensures supply for all possible demand realizations and
prices energy at the price cap, it becomes clear that, for a very small ﬁrm
entering the market, the incumbent’s incentive to supply all demand will
not change. However, when ﬁrms become similar in size, both ﬁrms could
freeride on its competitor to secure supply. Incentives to balance the grid
therefore will diﬀer with respect to each ﬁrm’s position in the merit order. In
line with propositions 2 and 3 small ﬁrms that bid inframarginal units may
withhold capacity, although this can cause rationing and blackouts. Larger
ﬁrms that supply marginal units care about serving all residual demand and
about maintaining network balance. Hence, small ﬁrms may freeride, with-
hold capacity, and force larger ﬁrms to secure stable grids at the margin.
This observation also explains the slope of the small ﬁrm’s capacity reac-
tion function, illustrating the strategic complementarity in supply oﬀers. If
large ﬁrms have large stakes in the market, small ﬁrms also increase their
19This results also holds when introducing positive constant marginal costs.
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capacities without fearing aggressive pricing by their larger competitors. If
the larger ﬁrm has a lower capacity endowment the smaller ﬁrm does not
increase its oﬀer to satisfy more demand, but reduces its capacity oﬀer to
avoid aggressive pricing.
4 Capacity mechanisms
In the capacity market regime the SO enforces regulatory driven capacity
decisions to increase system security. The SO can procure reserve capacity on
its own or set capacity obligations on retailers.20 Both mechanisms introduce
rewards for holding peak capacity available in real-time. Before capacity is
traded, the SO sets a capacity requirement, denoted as R. R is assumed to be
completely inelastic. In equilibrium, the capacity price pc reﬂects the relation
of all ﬁrms’ oﬀered available capacity to the SO’s required level of available
capacity. If energy from these reserved units is called, they are rewarded at
the prevailing energy market price. Denote the capacity they oﬀer on the
capacity market as kci and the amount of capacity that is procured from each
ﬁrm as ri. Firms then earn proﬁts of
E[πci ] = E[π
e
i (ki, ri)] + rip
c. (14)
Proﬁts at the capacity stage πci are the expected proﬁts each ﬁrm obtains
from their respective energy market capacities and from the part of these ca-
pacities that are rewarded a second time on the capacity market. Marginal
costs of holding capacity available are assumed to be zero. Each ﬁrm com-
mits to have its procured available capacity ready for dispatch and hence in
real-time must oﬀer capacity equal to or above its obligation, ki ≥ ri. In
real-time, all operating units, whether reserved or not, are rewarded at the
20In the latter case when retailers can buy capacity rights, in most power systems the SO
still acts on behalf of all retailers in the spot market for capacity and re-sells all capacity
to the retailers.
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prevailing real-time energy market price. Capacity mechanisms clear before
generating ﬁrms compete in the energy market, see the timeline in ﬁgure 3.
 
Capacity market Energy market
rewards available capacity
at the capacity price,
ﬁrms bid (bci , k
c
i )
determines energy price
and real-time capacity,
ﬁrms bid (bi, ki ≥ ri)
Figure 3: Stylized timeline.
Firms choose a price for capacity bci as well as the amount of available
capacity they want to oﬀer on the market kci . These bids determine the
capacity market price pc and each ﬁrms capacity obligation ri. Each ﬁrm’s
bid constitutes the capacity market price according to the uniform pricing
rule
pc =
{
bci = min{b1, b2} if R ≤ kci
max{b1, b2} if R ≥ kci .
(15)
Furthermore, due to the price-inelastic requirement, R, regulators set a ca-
pacity market price cap P c.
4.1 Capacity pricing
Equilibrium capacity price bids depend on each ﬁrm’s capacity oﬀer kci , as
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Firms’ equilibrium bids for capacity, bci , can be summarized
in four cases.
(i) If kci > R and k
c
j > R ﬁrms bid the unique equilibrium b
c∗
i = b
c∗
j = 0.
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(ii) If kci < R and k
c
j > R ﬁrm i chooses a bid in[
0, bc∗i ≤ P c
max{R− kci , 0}
min{kcj , R}
]
, (16)
while ﬁrm j bids the price cap bc∗j = P
c.
(iii) If kci < R, k
c
j < R and k
c
i + k
c
j > R, each ﬁrm can bid according to
equation (16) while the other ﬁrm bids the price cap.
(iv) If kci + k
c
j < R, then both ﬁrms bid the price cap for capacity, b
c∗
i =
bc∗j = P
c.
Proof. See LeCoq (2002) and Boom (2009) or A.6. 
This pricing strategy includes the Bertrand outcome: If both ﬁrms oﬀer
more capacity than R, both will price equal to zero. However, if ﬁrm i oﬀers
less capacity than R, it can bid according to equation (16). At this price
its competitor j is indiﬀerent between undercutting or taking the residual
capacity demand R − kci and bidding the price cap. Firm j earns max{R −
kci , k
c
j}P c while ﬁrm i’s proﬁts become kciP c. The same holds mutually for
ﬁrm j submitting the low price bid for kcj < R. For k
c
i < R and k
c
j < R, two
kinds of equilibria exist in which both ﬁrms can submit a price according to
equation (16) while its rival submits the price cap.
Proposition 5 If the SO wants to increase aggregate energy market capacity
through capacity mechanisms, the equilibrium price for capacity has to equal
the price cap for capacity.
Proof. First note that if the SO wants to prevent capacity withholding and
inﬂuence energy market prices, the SO has to set R bigger than k∗i , thus bigger
than the small ﬁrm’s optimal energy market supply without the capacity
mechanism. Hence, if R > k∗i , according to equation (15) and proposition 4
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the capacity market price must equal the price cap. If kcj > R, it cannot be
an equilibrium strategy for ﬁrm i to oﬀer any kci > R, because the capacity
price would fall to zero and in that case ﬁrm i would prefer to not commit
capacity at all and remain at its energy market optimum. If kcj < R the
capacity price also equals the price cap, irrespective of kci . 
Due to the concavity of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts, ﬁrm i only deviates from its
energy market optimum at positive capacity prices, which in equilibrium
have to equal the price cap.21 This result is not surprising and supported by
the observation that capacity prices are either close to zero or near to the
capacity price cap, see Stoft (2002).
4.2 Energy market distortions
Rewarding capacity changes ﬁnal energy market capacities, prices and black-
out probabilities. First note that for the large ﬁrm, the capacity market does
not cause any strategic eﬀects on its capacity oﬀer. The large capacity ﬁrm
still has no incentives to withdraw capacities on the energy market. To see
this, suppose that the larger bidder on the real-time market could have all
its energy market capacity rewarded as available capacity on the capacity
market, k∗j = rj. Its proﬁts are still monotonously increasing in rj, and the
large ﬁrm always maximizes its proﬁts in equation (14) for selling an as high
reserve capacity part of its real-time capacity as possible:
r∗j = k
∗
j = k¯j. (17)
Now suppose the smaller energy market bidder, ﬁrm i, could choose its capac-
ity, given any price for capacity. For any positive pc, the small ﬁrm supplies
21Assuming price elastic demand functions for capacity would not change the overall
result. The equilibrium price of capacity then would not be the price cap, but the residual
monopoly price that the high bidding ﬁrm would charge.
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more capacity than without the capacity reward. The small ﬁrm will ﬁnd it
optimal to oﬀer capacity so that it maximizes equation (14) such that
r∗i = max
ri
E[πrti (ri)] :
∂πi(ri)
∂ri
= −pc. (18)
The marginal loss from leaving its optimum in the real-time market - the
optimum when capacity is not rewarded - have to equal the marginal revenue
of selling one more unit of reserve capacity, or simply the capacity price. If
the equilibrium capacity price is zero, there is no incentive for the small ﬁrm
to deviate from its real-time market optimum. If the equilibrium capacity
price is positive, the small ﬁrm starts to oﬀer more capacity, if not bound
by its capacity constraint. The optimality condition in equation (18) also
exhibits a strategic relation between the SO’s choice of the price cap and
the capacity requirement. Capacity requirements, R, that are too low can
constrain capacity from being oﬀered on the energy market, although the
capacity price (which in equilibrium is the price cap P c) actually is high
enough to attract more available capacity from the withholding ﬁrm. In
turn, capacity price caps can be too high for a given capacity requirement
and increase the costs of procurement.
As derived, eﬃcient Bertrand competition in capacity markets does not
change system security and energy market outcomes. Dominant ﬁrms do
not deviate from their strategic optimum when capacity markets yield zero
proﬁts. Given that R is set high enough so that equation (18) holds, ag-
gregate energy market capacity with capacity payments is the sum of both
ﬁrms capacity oﬀers in equations (17) and (18). Blackout probabilities then
become
β =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− k¯j − k¯i if k¯i ≤ 16
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)
1− 1
6
(
7k¯j +
√
k¯j
(
13k¯j + 12
P c
P rt
))
else.
(19)
Proposition 6 At a competitive price for capacity system security is un-
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changed. The SO can only change energy market capacities and system se-
curity at noncompetitive and positive capacity prices. Blackout probabilities
increase in energy market price caps and decrease in capacity prices.
Proof. See equation (19). 
Equation (19) also shows that blackout probabilities increase for higher
energy market price caps. Higher energy market proﬁts require higher ca-
pacity market prices to set suﬃcient incentives for the ﬁrms to deviate from
the energy market optimum.
In times when capacity markets yield proﬁts, aggregate real-time market
capacity increases. As intended by the SO, this eﬀect decreases the expected
price for energy. To see this, note that in the short run the SO can only raise
capacities from the withholding small bidder, ﬁrm i. Therefore the price
eﬀect, derived from equation (11), is
∂E[prt]
∂ki
=
(kj − 4ki)
2kj
P rt +
2ki + kj
2kj
b, (20)
which is negative for all k∗i (k¯j | pc = 0) ≤ ki ≤ kj, that is, for all additional
capacity of ﬁrm i greater than its real-time oﬀer at a capacity price of zero.
Capacity markets lower the expected price for energy. However, since b =
e−((2ki)/kj)P rt and
∂b
∂ki
= −2e
− 2ki
kj P rt
kj
(21)
is negative for all k∗i (k¯j | pc = 0) ≤ ki ≤ kj, the strategy space of both
ﬁrms’ pricing strategies increases. Price volatility rises, since ﬁrms’ capaci-
ties become more similar. Thus, the quantity eﬀect of contracting available
capacity decreases the energy price but increases price volatility. The only
possible channel leading to a decrease in the energy price volatility are lower
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energy price caps, which as shown above decrease energy market proﬁts but
do not inﬂuence production decisions.
The result that capacity mechanisms and energy price caps can mitigate
market power and capacity withholding are in line with the ﬁndings of Joskow
and Tirole (2007) who show that capacity obligations and associated capac-
ity payments have the potential to compensate generators for the shortfall
in proﬁts incurred by the price cap on the energy market. Endogenizing the
capacity price as above, however, shows that capacity markets are only eﬀec-
tive when they reward capacity above the marginal costs of being available
and ﬁrms inﬂate their capacity market bids according to the losses they incur
from deviating from the energy market optimum.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of diﬀerent market designs on supply security
in imperfect power markets. The analysis focuses on peak time situations
and ﬁnds that energy-only markets can ensure enough available peak capac-
ity only for suﬃciently asymmetric ﬁrm sizes. When ﬁrms are similar in
size, each ﬁrm likes to withhold capacity and freeride on its competitor to
satisfy residual demand and to secure continuous trade on balanced power
networks. As a consequence, endogenous blackout probabilities arise that are
caused by capacity withholding rather than scarcity. In the duopoly market
equilibrium, this result translates into a larger ﬁrm that bids higher prices
and sells power at the margin, while the smaller ﬁrm bids lower energy prices
and withholds inframarginal capacity. Only the larger ﬁrm has an incentive
to maintain balanced grids and supply all stochastic demand. The smaller
ﬁrm risks blackouts when maximizing proﬁts. When the system operator
faces high demand that leads to a shortage of supply, and has to buy more
energy, the smaller ﬁrm then becomes a monopolist for out of market pur-
chases.
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When regulators implement capacity mechanisms such as SO reserve pro-
curement or capacity obligations, available peak capacity increases as long as
capacity prices are above marginal costs. In that case, capacity mechanisms
lower blackout probabilities, but increase energy price volatility. However,
energy price caps can reduce price volatility without eﬀecting system secu-
rity. Hence, energy price caps and capacity mechanisms can mitigate market
power in the energy market, but at high costs for available capacity.
The choice of market design depends on the ﬁrm size relation of dominant
ﬁrms in the market, but also on regulatory preferences for supply security.
Regulators have to balance the costs of capacity remuneration and the will-
ingness to administer capacity mechanisms and distort energy price signals in
the long run with short run beneﬁts of lower market prices and less capacity
withholding.
The future development of real-time pricing in the retail segment will
add an interesting new element to the discussion on market design and will,
on the ﬁrst glance, back up beneﬁts of energy-only markets. Consumers
will be able to react to price spikes and the need for price caps diminishes.
In turn, ﬂattening price spikes with capacity mechanisms and at the same
time incentivizing consumers to react to price spikes via smart meters might
counteract potential beneﬁts from smart grid and smart meter technology.
In what ways real-time pricing will eﬀect future electricity market designs
constitutes an interesting and open question for further research.
A Appendix
A.1 Non-existence of pure strategy equilibria in real-
time pricing
Suppose a pure strategy for ﬁrm i exists. Firm i submits a bid that is low enough to
attract ﬁrm j not to underbid but to bid the price cap and take the expected residual
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demand. If ﬁrm j then would underbid ﬁrm i, it would bid bj = bi − , where  is close to
zero. The critical low price, b∗i , for ﬁrm i thus has to satisfy
[bi − ]
∫ kj
0
θdθ + bi
∫ ki+kj
kj
(θ − kj)dθ ≤ P rt
∫ ki+kj
ki
(θ − ki)dθ
or, rearranging and ignoring 
bi ≤
k2j
k2i + k
2
j
P rt = b∗i .
Since for all 0 ≤ ki, kj ≤ 1, k
2
j
k2i +k
2
j
is between 0 and 1, such a price exists. Firm i’s proﬁts
for that strategy become bi
k2i
2 + P
rtkikj . The ﬁrst order condition with respect to bi is
strictly positive. Given that ﬁrm j bids at the price cap, ﬁrm i should bid the highest pos-
sible price in order to maximise its proﬁts, which is bidding equal to the price cap minus
an inﬁnitely small . In turn, ﬁrm j would underbid the price cap by two , because now
bi > b
∗
i . Both ﬁrms would race to the bottom, until ﬁrm i bids b
∗
i again. This contradicts
the only reasonable pure strategy candidate b∗i .
A.2 Mixed strategy pricing in the real-time market
Expected proﬁts in (2) can be rewritten to
E[πi] = bi
1
2
k2i
∫ bi
b
fj(bj)dbj +
∫ P rt
bi
(
bi
1
2
k2i + bjkikj
)
fj(bj)dbj
and further to
E[πi] = bi
1
2
k2i + kikj [P
rt − biFj(bi)− F¯j(P rt) + F¯j(bi)],
where F¯j(·) is the antiderivative of Fj(·). Taking the ﬁrst order condition, rearranging and
assuming a symmetric support of Fi(bi) and Fj(bj):
fj(bj) =
ki
2kjbj
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Integrating yields:
Fj(bj) =
ki
2kj
log(bj) + C,
where C is the constant of integration. Exploiting Fj(b) = 0:
Fj(bj) =
ki
2kj
log
(
bj
b
)
Now, for ki ≤ kj , at any given b, limbj→P rt Fj(bj) ≤ limbi→P rt Fi(bi), what implies that
limbi→P rt Fi(bi) = 1 must hold. Using Fi(P
rt) = 1 yields b = e−
2ki
kj
P rt .
A.3 Generic real-time demand distribution
Proﬁts in equations (5) and (6) can be rewritten as
E[πei (ki, kj)] =
(
lim
bj→P rt
Fj(bj)
∫ kj+ki
kj
(θ − kj)dθ
+
(
1− lim
bj→P rt
Fj(bj)
)(∫ ki
0
θdθ +
∫ ki+kj
ki
kidθ
))
P
and
E[πej (ki, kj)] =
∫ ki+kj
ki
(θ − ki)dθP.
Adding a general distribution of demand, g(θ), to the maximization problem in equation
(2), deriving the mixed strategies and calculating proﬁts then similarly to above yields
E[πei (ki, kj)] =
(
lim
bj→P rt
Fj(bj)
∫ kj+ki
kj
(θ − kj)g(θ)dθ
+
(
1− lim
bj→P rt
Fj(bj)
)(∫ ki
0
θg(θ)dθ +
∫ ki+kj
ki
kig(θ)dθ
))
P
and
E[πej (ki, kj)] =
∫ ki+kj
ki
(θ − ki)g(θ)dθP.
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It is easy to show that proﬁts of the larger ﬁrm j are increasing in kj and that as in equation
(6) the F.O.C. with respect to kj is greater than zero. Next note that limbj→P rt Fj(bj)
increases in ki in the small ﬁrm’s proﬁt function. In our setting of ki ≤ kj , we have
E[πei ] = E[π
e
j ] whenever ki = kj , because limbj→P rt Fj(bj) equals one and the second term
in ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function becomes zero. Then, ﬁrm i could always gain by withholding an
inﬁnitesimal amount of capacity and therefore being the ﬁrst to sell in expectation. Hence
in line with proposition 10, depending on k¯i ﬁrm i either oﬀers all available capacity or
withholds capacity.
A.4 Equilibrium proﬁts in the energy market
For expected real-time proﬁts for ﬁrm i and j, for ki ≤ kj , the withholding and the non-
withholding case have to be separated. In the non-withholding case proﬁts are equal to
equations (5) and (6) with ki = k∗i = k¯i = T − k¯j and kj = k¯j . For the withholding case,
ki(kj) = 16
(√
13k¯j + k¯j
)
, proﬁts of the small ﬁrm change to
πi(k¯j) =
1
108
(19 + 13
√
13)k¯j
2
P rt.
A.5 Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium selection is relevant when capacity endowments are suﬃciently similar and
allow for two equilibria. Otherwise, when ﬁrm size is suﬃciently asymmetric, the large
ﬁrm always ﬁnds it proﬁtable to become the large bidder. In this case, the equilibrium
in which the large ﬁrm is the small bidder vanishes. The critical capacity relation that
decides about the number of equilibria can be derived as follows. Proﬁts of the larger ﬁrm
j when being the small bidder are
πj(k¯j) =
1
108
(19 + 13
√
13)k¯i
2
P rt.
The latter term are proﬁts of the small ﬁrm and corrected for the fact that if the larger
ﬁrm j submitted the smaller capacity it had to react optimally to k¯i. This equilibrium in
which the large ﬁrm is the small bidder disappears when deviation proﬁts are higher than
the proﬁts of being the small bidder. When ﬁrm j deviates, and instead of k∗j (k¯i) plays
k¯j and oﬀers all capacity, proﬁts are
πj(k¯j) =
k¯j
2
2
P rt.
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Setting both terms equal one obtains the critical level of the small ﬁrm i’s capacity so that
the large ﬁrm j will always ﬁnd it optimal to be the large bidder,
k¯j
∗(k¯i) =
√
19 + 13
√
13
54
k¯i.
Whenever ﬁrm j holds less capacity and capacity endowments therefore are suﬃciently
similar, both ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to be the small bidder, given that its rival is the
large bidder. In that case two equilibria in capacity oﬀers remain.
Below I show that risk dominance applies and the equilibrium in which the ﬁrm with
larger capacity endowment submits the larger capacity risk dominates the equilibrium in
which the larger ﬁrm is the small bidder. Again, for k¯j > k¯i, all possible proﬁts can be
summarized by the matrix
i
j
k∗j (k¯i) k¯j
k∗i (k¯j) π
l
i(k
∗
i , k
∗
j ), π
s
j (k
∗
i , k
∗
j ) π
s
i (k
∗
i , k¯j), π
l
j(k
∗
i , k¯j)
k¯i π
l
i(k¯i, k
∗
j ), π
s
j (k¯i, k
∗
j ) π
s
i (k¯i, k¯j), π
l
j(k¯i, k¯j)
where the indices s and l indicate which player oﬀers the smaller respectively larger ca-
pacity in each outcome. For the equilibrium [k∗i , k¯j ] to risk dominate [k¯i, k
∗
j ] and therefore
the large ﬁrm to submit the large quantity in the auction
[
πsi (k¯i, k¯j)− πsi (k∗i , k¯j)
] [
πsj(k
∗
i , k
∗
j )− πlj(k∗i , k¯j)
] ≥[
πli(k
∗
i , k
∗
j )− πli(k¯i, k∗j )
] [
πlj(k¯i, k¯j)− πsj(k¯i, k∗j )
]
needs to hold. Inserting the respective proﬁt functions we get the inequality
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[(
k¯i + 2k¯j − 2k¯i
2
k¯j
)
k¯i
2
P rt − 19 + 13
√
13
108
k¯j
2
P rt
]
[
7 +
√
13
−36k¯j
k¯i
(
2k¯i
2 − k¯ik¯j + 2k¯j2
)
P rt − k¯j
2
2
P rt
]
≥
[
(k¯j +
√
13k¯j)2
72
P rt − k¯i
2
2
P rt
][
k¯j
2
2
P rt − 19 + 13
√
13
108
k¯i
2
P rt
]
which holds for all k¯i < k¯j < k¯j
∗(k¯i) =
√
19+13
√
13
54 k¯i and k¯i + k¯j = T ≤ θ¯ = 1.
A.6 Capacity pricing
Case (i) is the Bertrand outcome. In case (iv) capacity oﬀers are so small such that both
ﬁrms cannot serve their residual demand and charge the monopoly price. Cases (ii) and
(iii) are derived as follows. For any capacity requirement R a ﬁrm i can submit a bid
bc∗i min{kcj , R} ≤ P cmax{R− kci , 0}
that makes ﬁrm j indiﬀerent between undercutting and earning (bc∗i − )min{kcj , R} and
supplying the residual demand max{R − kci , 0} and bidding the price cap. Rearranging
yields equation (16). The high bidding ﬁrm never wants to deviate by construction.
The ﬁrm that submits the low bid as derived above never wants to overbid, because
the equilibrium price would still be the price cap and the overbidding ﬁrm would only sell
less capacity and loose proﬁts.
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We examine welfare eﬀects of real-time pricing in electricity mar-
kets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers
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in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on
behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time
meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does
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1 Introduction
Real-time pricing of electricity for residential households and small businesses
was for a long time technologically and economically not viable. Tradition-
ally, ﬁnal consumers had a meter that simply measured the total amount
of electricity consumed without keeping track of when consumers actually
consumed what amounts of electricity. For this reason it was not possible to
diﬀerentiate prices to reﬂect the scarcity of electricity at each point in time,
which made consumers unable to react to price signals. This lack of con-
sumer response translates into highly inelastic market demand in electricity
wholesale markets, which facilitates the exercise of market power especially
in peak times, (see, e.g., Stoft, 2002, p.78f). In addition the absence of price
signals prevents any consumption smoothing over time and thus aggravates
the system operator’s problem to constantly balance supply and demand.
Since electricity is hardly storable, not achieving a balance results in costly
blackouts and consumer rationing.
Recent technological developments and the rising need for more eﬃcient
power grids have however increased the attention on exploiting eﬃciency
potentials through smarter metering. A number of ﬁrms have invented new
meter technologies to reap such eﬃciency gains, which led to a drastic in-
crease in venture capital for smart meter technologies.1 This new develop-
ment of smart grids and smart meters aims at allowing electricity providers
to transmit time varying price signals, that in turn enable even residential
households and small businesses to adjust their consumption over the day ac-
cordingly.2 However, the installation of smart meters and smart grids changes
the design of all current transmission networks and is extremely costly. Thus,
there is considerable uncertainty in the welfare eﬀects and the proﬁtability
of real-time metering technology. We ask how the introduction of real-time
1See The Economist (2009b).
2See The Economist (2009a).
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metering will beneﬁt consumers, producers and overall welfare.
That prices should ﬂuctuate if capacities cannot easily be adapted to ﬂuctu-
ating and uncertain demand is an insight gained from the peak-load pricing
literature that started already in the ﬁfties (for a survey see Crew et al.
(1995)). More recently, Borenstein and Holland (2005) developed a model
where ﬁrms invest in electricity generating capacity in the ﬁrst stage and then
compete in a perfectly competitive electricity market for a certain number of
periods with a time-varying demand. They show that the market outcome is
not eﬃcient if not all consumers are on real time pricing schedules. Further-
more, the market outcome is less than second-best eﬃcient, even if one takes
into account that some consumers are priced only according to the average
wholesale costs of serving them with a time-invariant price instead of paying
the time-variant wholesale price in each single period. However, increasing
the number of customers on real-time pricing does not necessarily increase
social welfare, although having all customers on real-time pricing is always
Pareto superior to having some of them on time-invariant rates.3
We derive eﬃciency eﬀects of real-time pricing when generating ﬁrms have
market power in the electricity wholesale market and consumers are risk-
averse. We explicitly distinguish between the wholesale and the retail mar-
ket of electricity, and assume market power in the wholesale market with
only two ﬁrms generating and selling electricity. The retail sector is per-
fectly competitive. Like in Borenstein and Holland (2005), we assume that
consumers who are on real-time pricing schedules can express their demand
on the wholesale market either directly or indirectly via their competitive
retailer. The consumers who are not on real-time meters need to contract
with retailers before their own and the aggregate level of demand is known.
Therefore they will ﬁnally pay the same price no matter what the level of de-
3Holland and Mansur (2006) simulate the short-run eﬃciency gains without capacity
investments from increasing the share of customers on real-time pricing in a model close
to Borenstein and Holland (2005) for the PJM market and can only identify moderate
eﬃciency increases for this case.
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mand will be. Joskow and Tirole (2006) and Joskow and Tirole (2007) both
mainly focus on the retail market without taking into account repercussions
to the potentially non-competitive wholesale market.4 Contrary to the for-
mer and in line with the latter we abstract from monopoly distribution and
assume that all retailers compete on a level playing ﬁeld. Like Borenstein and
Holland (2005), we model uniform retail prices whereas Joskow and Tirole
(2006) and Joskow and Tirole (2007) allow for two-part tariﬀs.
Neither Borenstein and Holland (2005) nor the empirical studies that try
to estimate the welfare eﬀects of existing real-time pricing initiatives for
large industrial customers (see Taylor et al. (2005)) take into account the
insurance eﬀect of ﬁxed prices. Most analyses implicitly assume that the
volatile demand is certain and therefore sum up the consumer surplus for
all diﬀerent time periods to determine consumer welfare. We instead assume
demand uncertainty and consider concave surplus functions for our costumers
when deriving welfare statements. Taking this risk aversion into account
explicitly allows us to check whether the positive eﬃciency eﬀects of real-
time electricity pricing are potentially counteracted by the increase in price
risks that risk-averse consumers dislike.
Our model is based on Boom and Buehler (2007). We introduce real time
pricing and diﬀerentiated consumers, that is, each consumer demands a diﬀer-
ent quantity of electricity although they are all exposed to the same demand
shock. Motivated by the observation that in most electricity markets larger
consumers, e.g. private businesses, installed smart meters before smaller cus-
tomers such as private households did, we assume that consumers with the
highest demand will be served with real-time metering and pricing ﬁrst.5 As
4Joskow and Tirole (2007) derive optimal retail prices, rationing rules and capacity
investments with price-sensitive and price-insensitive consumers.
5Empirical studies of existing real time pricing programs with the exception of Allcott
(2009) focus only on large industrial customers (see Patrick and Wolak (2001), Taylor
et al. (2005), Boisvert et al. (2007), and Zarnikau and Hallett (2008)). Allcott (2009) is
the only one who reports on a small scale real-time pricing experiment with residential
households in Chicago in 2003.
40
Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?
the degree of real-time pricing increases, the consumers that enter real-time
pricing in our model will have a lower demand than those already in the pro-
gram. Hence, our model set up also allows us to conclude whether real-time
pricing is more beneﬁcial for large or small customers.
The next section presents the modeling framework. Section three derives
the model outcome and presents wholesale and retail market equilibria. In
section four, we present comparative statics in the level of real-time pricing
and derive welfare statements. Section ﬁve concludes.
2 The model
In a mass of N consumers with N = 1, each consumer can be of a diﬀerent
type α which is drawn from a uniform distribution on
[
1
2
, 3
2
]
. The preferences
of a consumer of type α are represented by the consumer surplus function
V (x, α, ε, p) = α(x− ε)− (x− ε)
2
2
− px, (1)
where p is the electricity price, x the electricity consumed and ε a shock that
aﬀects all consumers alike and is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Maximizing the surplus with respect to the consumed electricity x yields the
consumer’s individual demand6
x(p, α, ε) = max{α + ε− p, 0}. (2)
We assume that the consumers with small demand, meaning α ≤ α˜, do not
have a smart meter and need to contract with one of the retailers and pay
the retail price p = r. Consumers with a relatively large demand, deﬁned by
6The demand is modeled similarly to Boom and Buehler (2007) and Boom (2009).
However, there all consumers have α = 1 and thus identical demand.
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α > α˜ are on real-time meters and purchase their electricity directly on the
wholesale market at the wholesale price p = p∗.7 The threshold separating
large and small consumers, i.e. consumers with and without real-time meters,
has to lie within the support of α, that is, 1
2
≤ α˜ ≤ 3
2
.
There are n ≥ 2 retailers who compete a` la Bertrand. Consumers without
a smart meter subscribe to the retailer with the lowest retail price r while
their actual level of demand is still uncertain. For the sake of simplicity we
assume zero retail costs. Retailers’ marginal costs then equal the wholesale
price for which they buy electricity. The retailers announce their customers’
demand for electricity to the wholesale auction after they have observed the
actual level of demand, that is the realization of ε. Retailers with supply
obligations go out of business as soon as their marginal costs, the wholesale
market price p∗, exceeds the retail price r. Then their customers will not
be served with electricity, but the system operator is able to ration retail
consumers and a blackout does not occur.8
Electricity is only produced by two electricity generating ﬁrms A and B.
Each generator i = A,B is capacity constrained and owns capacity Ki. Both
generators use an identical technology with constant marginal costs c which
are normalized to zero. Generating ﬁrms can produce up to their capacity
Ki but not beyond that quantity. They can sell their electricity only via the
wholesale market, run by the system operator as a uniform price auction.
Before each ﬁrm submits its supply bid to the wholesale market, the total
demand, meaning the level of ε, is publicly known. In the auction each ﬁrm
only announces a price pi at and above which they are willing to produce up
7Note that it does not matter whether customers on real-time meters bid their demand
directly into the wholesale auction or whether they have a contract with a perfectly com-
petitive retailer without retail costs. Borenstein and Holland (2005), Joskow and Tirole
(2006) and (2007) also assume that consumers on real-time pricing pay the wholesale price.
8The latter assumption means that the system operator has perfect control over the
grid and can selectively take customers oﬀ-line. This assumption is in line with Joskow
and Tirole (2007) and will ﬁnally lead to eﬃcient rationing. In the perfect smart grid
scenario, eﬃcient rationing is possible. However, today it is not implementable.
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to their total capacity. Fabra and von der Fehr (2006) show in their analysis
that despite diﬀerent optimal bidding strategies the market outcome would
not change if we allowed for a ﬁnite but larger number of steps in the bidding
function of the generators.
The system operator runs a uniform price auction.9 To clear the auction,
the system operator ﬁrst aggregates all submitted capacity at each price bid,
and then ﬁnds the market clearing price, that equates supply and the level
of demand stemming from the consumers on smart-meters and the ones that
contract with a retailer and pay the retail price r. Three situations can occur:
1. The capacity of the low-bidding generator is suﬃcient to satisfy all
demand at this low price. The wholesale price p∗ = pi with pi ≤ pj
and i, j = A,B and only the low bidding ﬁrm is called to generate the
amount of electricity necessary to satisfy demand D(p∗, r, α˜, ε).
2. The capacity of the low-bidding ﬁrm is insuﬃcient to satisfy demand
at this low price, but the total capacity of both ﬁrms is suﬃcient to
satisfy the demand at the higher of the two prices. The wholesale price
is p∗ = pj with pi ≤ pj and i, j = A,B. The low-bidding ﬁrm can
deliver its total capacity Ki whereas the high-bidding ﬁrm is rationed
to the amount of electricity that is necessary to satisfy residual demand
(D(p∗, r, α˜, ε)−Ki).
3. The capacity of the low-bidding ﬁrm is insuﬃcient to satisfy demand
at this low price and total capacity is also insuﬃcient to satisfy the
demand at the higher of the two prices. The wholesale price p∗ is the
price at which total demand satisﬁes total capacity (D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =
KA +KB). Both ﬁrms generate electricity at their capacity constraint.
9Multi-unit uniform price auctions are used in most major electricity markets in Europe
and the US. The other alternative is a discriminatory auction format, to which the UK
market switched in 2001 when introducing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA). For a theoretical comparison of both auction formats see Fabra and von der Fehr
(2006).
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All generators are paid the equilibrium price p∗ for all the electricity they
deliver no matter what their price bid was. Before this wholesale auction
is held, retailers contract with the ﬁnal consumers. Figure 1 illustrates the
timing of the model.

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Figure 1: Timing of the model
In the ﬁrst stage of the game before the level of demand is known retailers set
their retail prices for customers without real time meters. These customers
contract with the retailer who oﬀers the lowest price.10 Then, nature draws
the demand shock ε and demand is known to the generators, the retailers,
the consumers with real-time metering and the system operator. Consumers
with real-time metering bid their demand, and non-bankrupt retailers the
demand of their contracted customers. The two generators bid the prices at
which they are willing to produce up to their total capacity, and ﬁnally the
system operator determines the wholesale electricity price p∗ as described
above. We search for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
10The contract is a service contract and implies that the costumers are provided with as
much electricity as they want as long as the retailer does not go out of business. Rationing
rules as discussed in Joskow and Tirole (2007) are not part of the contract and are also
not very common for residential households.
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3 Analysis of the model
Since we are looking for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game we start
the analysis with the last stage of the game, the wholesale market. After
deriving the market outcome of the wholesale market for given retail prices,
capacities and levels of smart metering we determine the retail price for those
customers who do not have a smart meter for given capacities and levels of
smart metering.
3.1 The wholesale market
By the time the wholesale market clears, the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] is
known to all market participants. The threshold α˜ ∈ [1
2
, 3
2
] deﬁnes the mass
of consumers who are on pre-determined ﬁxed retail prices and the mass
of consumers who have a smart meter and can directly participate in the
wholesale market. This threshold is exogenous and known to all market
participants.
The group with α ≤ α˜ buys electricity via their retailers and pays the pre-
determined retail price r. Given r, their retailers demand a ﬁxed volume of
electricity which is derived from aggregating their individual demand, given
in (2). The retailers’ demand from consumers without a smart meter is
represented by
DR(r, α˜, ε, p∗) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ α˜
1
2
α + ε− rdα if p∗ ≤ r ≤ 1
2
+ ε,∫ α˜
r− α + ε− rdα if max
{
p∗, 1
2
+ ε
} ≤ r ≤
α˜ + ε,
0 if either r < p∗ or r > α˜ + ε.
(3)
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Retail demand is completely inelastic in the wholesale price p∗. As soon as
the wholesale price exceeds the retail price, r > p∗, retailers stop demanding
and serving their retail customers, because otherwise retailers suﬀer losses.
The level of ﬁxed retail demand depends on the pre-determined retail price
r. For the retail price, we have to distinguish three cases: In the ﬁrst case
the retail price is small enough such that all customers with α < α˜ have a
positive demand r ≤ 1
2
+ ε. With 1
2
+ ε < r ≤ α˜+ ε some consumers without
smart metering do not buy any electricity anymore because it is too costly
and with r > α˜ + ε no customer on traditional meters demands electricity.
Consumers with smart meters directly take part in the wholesale market.
Aggregating their individual demand from (2) yields
DW (p∗, α˜, ε) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ 3
2
α˜
α + ε− p∗dα if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε,∫ 3
2
p∗−ε α + ε− p∗dα if α˜ + ε < p∗ ≤ 32 + ε,
0 if 3
2
+ ε < p∗.
(4)
Demand from consumers with smart meters is elastic in the wholesale price
p∗. Again, we have to distinguish the three cases where all smart meter
customers have a positive demand (0 ≤ p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε), where some of them
stop buying (α˜+ε < p∗ ≤ 3
2
+ε), and where the price exceeds the reservation
price and all of them stop buying electricity (p∗ > 3
2
+ ε).
Aggregate total demand then is the sum of the demand from the consumers
with a predetermined retail price and from those on smart metering and is
given by
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) = DR(r, α˜, ε, p∗) + DW (p∗, α˜, ε). (5)
Total demand in the wholesale market is sketched in ﬁgure 2.
Total demand is discontinuous at p∗ = r if r < α˜ + ε, has the same constant
slope for 0 ≤ p∗ < r and for r < p∗ < α˜ + ε and is convexly decreasing for
α˜ + ε ≤ p∗ ≤ 3
2
+ ε.
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D(p∗, r, α˜, ε)
Figure 2: Total Demand in the Wholesale Market with r < α˜ + ε
The two generators A and B know the total realized demand when they bid
their price into the market. Their optimal bidding strategies depend on their
own and their rival’s capacity KA and KB, on the retail price r, on the level
of smart metering determined by α˜ and on the level of the demand shock ε.
Proposition 1 With regard to the market equilibria on the wholesale market
we can distinguish ﬁve cases.
(i) If Ki ≥ D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Kj ≥ D(0, r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B the ﬁrms
bid in the unique equilibrium pi = 0 and pj = 0 resulting in the uniform
auction price of p∗ = 0.
(ii) If 0 ≤ Ki < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B there
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are multiple equilibria. In all these equilibria the ﬁrms bid pj = p
∗
j with
p∗j = argmax
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]}
and 0 ≤ pi < p¯i < p∗j where p¯i is implicitly deﬁned by (17). The unique
auction price is p∗ = p∗j .
(iii) If 0 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε) − Kj ≤ Ki < Ki we
have the same equilibria as in (ii). Ki is either deﬁned in equation
(34), (35) or (36).
(iv) If Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Ki < Ki ≤ Kj with i, j = A,B the
uniform price auction has two types of equilibria, one type is identical
with the one in (ii), in the other one the ﬁrms bid pi = p
∗
i with
p∗i = argmax
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Kj]} ≤ p∗j
and 0 ≤ pj < p¯j < p∗i where p¯j is implicitly deﬁned by the equivalent to
(17). The auction price in the latter type of equilibrium is p∗ = p∗i .
(v) If Ki < Kj and Ki + Kj < D(p
∗
j , r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B there are
multiple equilibria in which the two ﬁrms bid pi ≤ pˆ and pj ≤ pˆ with
pˆ = {p|Ki + Kj = D(p, r, α˜, ε)} > p∗j ≥ p∗i .
The auction price is nevertheless unique and given by p∗ = pˆ.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Note that multiple equilibria occur as soon as ﬁrms are capacity constrained
(cases (ii)-(v) of proposition 1). The multiplicity only leads to diﬀerent equi-
librium wholesale prices and diﬀerent proﬁts for the two generators if their
capacities are of a relatively similar size and satisfy case (iv) of proposition
48
Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?
1. In this case there exist two types of equilibria where either the high ca-
pacity ﬁrm or the low capacity ﬁrm bids the high price in equilibrium. The
high price maximizes the monopoly proﬁt on the residual demand. If the
ﬁrms’ capacities diﬀer more (cases (ii) and (iii)) it is always the ﬁrm with
the larger capacity that bids high and serves the residual demand whereas
the small ﬁrm bids low and sells its total capacity. In case (v) the market
does not clear at the monopoly price on the residual demand. The demand
cannot be served by the two ﬁrms at this price. The low capacity ﬁrm never
has an incentive to bid a higher price than the large capacity ﬁrm and the
system operator needs to increase the large capacity ﬁrm’s bid to balance the
market.
Whenever multiple equilibria occur, we select the equilibrium in which the
larger ﬁrm is bidding the high price. For completely inelastic demand Boom
(2008) argues that the equilibria with the large ﬁrm bidding the high price
and the small ﬁrm undercutting it, risk-dominate the equilibria where the
roles are reversed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to verify whether this
selection can also be supported with elastic demand. Empirical ﬁndings by
Wolfram (1998), however, show that for the UK electricity market it indeed
is the larger ﬁrm that is the pivotal bidder and submits the market clearing
price. With identical capacities we assume that each of the two ﬁrms is
equally likely to choose the high price in equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates all equilibria of proposition 1. For a given demand shock
ε, a given level of real time pricing α˜ and a given retail price r the equilib-
rium auction price is a function of the capacity levels of the two ﬁrms. The
equilibrium prices depend on each ﬁrm’s capacities. As derived in Appendix
A, the borders for which the large and high pricing ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to
price above, at or below the retail price are denoted as K1 and K2, respec-
tively. Whenever both ﬁrms can serve the entire market on their own and
have capacities larger than D0 the equilibrium price equals zero which is the
Bertrand outcome. Figure 3 is drawn for relatively low retail prices because
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Figure 3: The Auction Prices in the Wholesale Market for Low Retail Prices
there exist capacity combinations 0 < min{KA, KB} < K1 for which the
equilibrium prices are above the retail price level r. For this case to be true
K1 as deﬁned in (20) in Appendix A.2 needs to be positive which is equiva-
lent to 0 < r < r1, where r1 = {r|K1 = 0} is depicted in ﬁgure 4. If K1 < 0,
wholesale prices above the retail price cannot be an equilibrium, unless the
system operator has to set the wholesale price. In the south west corner of
ﬁgure 3 we always ﬁnd an area where the system operator needs to set the
price above the highest price bid to clear the market.11 The discontinuity of
11Borders for these areas are given by Si in (31), (32) or (33) in Appendix A.3. As the
retail price increases these borders shift inward for those areas with min{KA,KB} > K1.
Higher retail prices reduce demand and therefore the system operator needs to interfere
less often to ensure market clearing. When the market outcome is determined by capac-
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the system operator price regions at min{KA, KB} = K1 is due to the jump
of the potential wholesale price from p∗ > r to p∗ = r, which is induced by
the kink in the demand curve due to the sudden inclusion of the customers
without real time pricing (see the demand in ﬁgure 2). The overall pricing
pattern described in ﬁgure 3 is intuitive. The larger the capacities the smaller
is the wholesale price.
Considering the speciﬁc equilibrium prices, given in (19), (24) and (28) Ap-
pendix A.2, it becomes clear that the wholesale price depends only on the
capacity of the smaller ﬁrm. This is because the smaller ﬁrm’s capacity deter-
mines the residual demand for the larger and pivotal ﬁrm that decides on the
wholesale price in all cases where at least one ﬁrm is capacity constrained.
For higher demand shocks capacities are relatively scarcer and hence the
borders deﬁning the equilibrium prices shift outwards. On the contrary for
increasing retail prices, the borders shift inwards. Figure 4 shows which
wholesale price regimes are relevant given the retail price and the level of
smart metering. For r < r1 all three wholesale price regimes depicted in
ﬁgure 3 exist. For intermediate retail prices r1 < r < r2 ﬁgure 3 would sim-
plify and wholesale prices above the retail price would no longer be possible.
For r2 < r < α˜ + ε the critical capacity level K2 or K
′
2, as deﬁned in equa-
tion (21) or (25), respectively, are no longer positive.12 In that case ﬁgure
3 simpliﬁes even further and 0 ≤ p∗ < r must hold in equilibrium. Note
that for r > α˜ + ε the retail price does not matter any more for the level
of the wholesale price because at these retail prices no retail customer has a
positive demand. Figure 3 would have only one horizontal and vertical line,
which would no longer be deﬁned by min{KA, Kb} = D′0 with D′0 deﬁned in
(26), but by min{KA, Kb} = D′′0 with D′′0 deﬁned in (29) in Appendix A.2.
ities that satisfy min{KA,KB} < K1, increases in the retail price are irrelevant, because
retailers have left the market.
12The critical retail price r2 is deﬁned by either r2 = {r|K2 = 0} or r2 = {r|K ′2 = 0}
depending on whether it exceeds the level r = ε + 12 or not, so on whether all retail
customers have still a positive demand or not. The critical retail price r2 increases and is
continuous in α˜ as is sketched in ﬁgure 4.
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Depending on whether 0 < min{KA, Kb} < D′′0 holds or min{KA, Kb} > D′′0
we would either have p∗ > 0 or p∗ = 0.13


r
α˜12
3
2
ε + 12
ε + α˜
ε + 32
K1 > 0
K2 > 0
K1 < 0
K2 > 0
K1 < 0
K ′2 < 0
K1 < 0
K ′2 > 0


r1
r2
K2 < 0
K1 < 0 
Figure 4: Critical Retail Price Levels
3.2 The retail market
Retailers compete in prices and do not have any other retail costs than the
price they need to pay for electricity on the wholesale market. Therefore
all retailers compete the price down to a level where they do not generate
positive proﬁts any more. Retailers have zero proﬁts if they ﬁnd themselves
for every potential demand induced by ε in a situation where the wholesale
13With completely inelastic demand, as in Boom and Buehler (2007), p∗ > 0 or p∗ = 0
always are the only possible outcomes.
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price satisﬁes p∗ ≥ r. Looking at the lattice pattern in ﬁgure 3 it becomes
obvious that this condition is satisﬁed if K2 > min{KA, KB} or, if it becomes
relevant, K ′2 > min{KA, KB} for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Retailers compete in the
retail price until the generating ﬁrms’ capacities ensure a wholesale price
that equals the retail price at a demand shock of ε = 0. This condition
guarantees zero proﬁts for retailers for all ε ∈ [0, 1] and all p∗ ≥ r. From this
idea we can derive the following proposition which describes the retail price
in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume Ki ≤ Kj, then there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which all retailers set r = r¯ = 0, if Ki > 1. If Ki ≤ 1 then
there are multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In all these equilibria the
retailers charge their customers retail prices which satisfy 0 ≤ r ≤ r¯. The
level of r¯ depends on the capacity levels Ki and Kj and on the level of smart
metering reﬂected in α˜. The deﬁnition of r¯ is given by
r¯ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3
2
−√2(Ki + Kj) if 0 ≤ Ki <
min
{
9
8
− 2Kj(9−(9−2α˜)α˜−Kj)
(3−2α˜)2 ,
1−2Kj
2
}
,
3− α˜− 1
2
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki if max
{
9
8
− 2Kj(9−(9−2α˜)α˜−Kj)
(3−2α˜)2 , 0
}
≤ Ki < min
{
1
2
(α˜− 1
2
), Kj
}
,
1−Ki −Kj if 1−2Kj2 ≤ Ki ≤ min{1− (5−2α˜)Kj3−2α˜ ,
Kj},
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ if max
{
1
2
(
α˜− 1
2
)
, 1− (5−2α˜)Kj
3−2α˜
}
≤ Ki < min{1, Kj},
0 if 1 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Note that we potentially have multiple equilibria. We follow the convention
in economics that we assume that ﬁrms stop undercutting each others prices
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as soon as they generate zero proﬁts. For retailers this condition translates
into all retailers setting r = r¯ if 0 ≤ min{KA, KB} < 1 and r = r¯ = 0
otherwise. The relationship between the diﬀerent capacity levels and the
retail price is characterized in ﬁgure 5.
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Figure 5: Retail Price with Diﬀerent Capacities for Ki ≤ Kj
From proposition 2 it becomes clear that the retail price r¯ only changes
marginally in the level of smart metering if we are in the cases represented
by the second and fourth line of its deﬁnition. These are the cases where
the generating ﬁrms’ capacities are suﬃcient such that the system operator
does not need to interfere with the generators’ price bidding on the electricity
wholesale market for the smallest demand shock ε = 0. For these cases the
retail price decreases if the level of smart metering increases because ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0
and a lower α˜ means more customers with smart meters. A larger number of
smart meters decreases the retail demand and hence the retail price is low-
ered. In addition, because of the lower retail demand the retail market is now
for more combinations of KA and KB fully covered instead of only partially
covered. Thus, for the capacities for which ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0 holds consumers without
smart meters will always beneﬁt from more (other) consumers having a smart
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meter and taking part directly in the wholesale market. The same eﬀect has
been found by Borenstein and Holland (2005). Since in their analysis all
consumers were identical and more smart metering did not imply reducing
the willingness to pay of the customers without a smart meter, this result is
not simply driven by the lower willingness to pay of the customers without
real time prices. Retail prices are determined by ﬁerce price competition by
the retailers who cannot just expropriate the consumers’ rent.
If the capacities of the electricity generating ﬁrms are so low that the sys-
tem operator needs to interfere with the price bidding of the generators for
all possible levels of the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] then the retail price does
marginally not respond to a higher degree of metering. The main reason for
this is that how consumers are split and how price responsive the wholesale
demand is on the margin, does not inﬂuence the wholesale prices. Instead,
wholesale prices are always determined by equalizing total demand with to-
tal capacity. Then, given that the retail price is determined by the lowest
possible wholesale price being below or equal to the retail price, also the re-
tail price solely depends on the ﬁrms’ capacities. The higher the ﬁrms’ total
capacity is, the lower is the lowest possible wholesale and the resale price.
4 Comparative statics in the level of smart
metering
Retailers always have zero proﬁts and therefore do not have an impact on
welfare as the level of smart metering changes. Only their competitive retail
price and the wholesale market price eﬀect welfare. Thus, we consider how
a change in the level of smart metering changes retail and wholesale prices
for all possible states of demand realizations. We use these prices to derive
expected proﬁts, consumer surplus and welfare ex ante of the demand real-
ization. For the sake of tractability we only look at the cases in which the
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retail prices are indeed determined by α˜ and the SO does not have to inter-
vene in the market. This in turn assumes that the ﬁrms are always investing
suﬃciently in their capacity endowments and the market always clears at the
residual monopoly price of the high bidding ﬁrm.
We use the consumer surplus function and the three equilibrium retail prices
in proposition 2 that depend on α˜ (cases (i), (ii) and (iv)) to calculate ex-
pected welfare. From the consumer surplus function in equation (1) we know
that those consumers who are served will achieve a surplus of
V (α + ε− p, α, ε, p) = α(α− p)− (α− p)
2
2
− p(α + ε− p), (6)
where due to our assumption that the SO never has to intervene p is either
the wholesale price p∗ = p∗j > r that varies according to the state of demand
ε or the predetermined retail price r that does not change with the demand
realization. Those consumers who are either not served or who decide them-
selves that they do not want to consume realize a surplus of
V (0, α, ε, p) = −αε− ε
2
2
. (7)
Customers on traditional meters always pay their contracted retail price and
hence we have p = r in equation (6) for all 1
2
< α < α˜. The wholesale
price that consumers with smart meters pay can be either p∗ = p∗j or p
∗ = r.
We can have both prices for consumers with α˜ < α < 3
2
. The level of
the wholesale price depends on whether Ki is smaller or greater than K1.
If Ki ≥ K1 the residual monopoly price equals the retail price, while for
Ki < K1 the residual monopoly price lies on the linear downward sloping
part of the demand curve above the retail price. To account for the diﬀerent
wholesale market prices in the welfare calculations we deﬁne a critical demand
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shock, ε∗. Whenever the demand shock is larger than
ε∗ = {ε | Ki = K1} (8)
the low bidding ﬁrm’s capacity is relatively scarce and the wholesale price
becomes p∗ = p∗j . For lower demand shocks than ε
∗ the wholesale market
price remains equal to the retail price. The critical shock ε∗ depends on the
retail price. In the following we distinguish between equilibrium retail prices
of zero (case (i) in proposition 2), intermediate equilibrium retail prices (case
(ii)) and high equilibrium retail prices (case (iv)).
4.1 Equilibrium retail prices of zero
When capacities satisfy 1 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj the retail price is zero. In this scenario
the SO never has to intervene, because Ki +Kj ≥ 2 ≥ D0 holds and the two
ﬁrms can cover all demand at each price for all demand realizations. Figure
3 simpliﬁes because K2 = D0, and the wholesale price can be either p
∗ = p∗j
or p∗ = r = 0. For r = 0 the critical demand shock in equation (8) becomes
ε∗z =
8Ki + 4α˜
2 − 9
12− 8α˜ . (9)
In Appendix C.1 we derive ε∗z. If the demand shock is larger than ε
∗
z the
wholesale price becomes p∗ = p∗j , while for lower demand shocks the wholesale
market price is zero. Wholesale prices of p∗ = p∗j never occur as long as ε
∗
z > 1,
which holds as long as Ki > max{1, 18(3 − 2α˜)(7 + 2α˜)}. If Ki exceeds this
threshold the highest demand shock cannot be so large to make it optimal
for the high bidding ﬁrm to price above the retail price. Then all consumers
always pay a price of zero no matter whether they have a smart meter and
participate in the wholesale market or whether they have a retail contract
with a predetermined price. Therefore welfare is identical with aggregate
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consumer surplus which is deﬁned by
CS = W =
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
1
2
α2
2
dαdε =
13
24
. (10)
Generators do not earn any proﬁts. If however 1 < Ki ≤ 18(3− 2α˜)(7 + 2α˜)
and ε∗z ≤ 1 then wholesale customers have to pay a positive price for some
states of demand. In these states retail customers are not served because
p∗ > r. This happens if ε∗ = ε∗z ≤ ε ≤ 1. The consumer surplus is now
CS =
∫ ε∗
0
∫ 3
2
1
2
α2
2
dαdε +
∫ 1
ε∗
∫ α˜
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (11)
+
∫ 1
ε∗
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− p∗)− (α− p
∗)2
2
− p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε.
Substituting the relevant price which is always given by p∗j from (19) we
can show that ∂CS
∂α˜
> 0 holds. Aggregate consumer surplus decreases if
the level of smart metering increases (meaning that α˜ decreases). While
wholesale costumers face price risks in potentially having to pay positive
duopoly prices, retail customers are not served for some demand realizations.
By increasing the number of wholesale customers the ﬁrst eﬀect aggravates,
whereas the second is softened. Since consumer surplus is reduced the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates the second. The producer surplus is given by
PS = πi + πj =
∫ 1
ε1
∫ 3
2
α˜
p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε. (12)
The producer surplus increases with the level of smart metering since ∂PS
∂α˜
<
0 holds. This is not surprising because more smart metering means more
demand situations in which wholesale customers pay a positive price and,
on top of it, there are more wholesale customers who have to pay the higher
price. Because of the opposing nature of consumer and producer surplus,
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welfare is U-shaped in the level of smart metering. For small α˜ we have
∂W
∂α˜
< 0 while for larger we have ∂W
∂α˜
> 0. Obviously the eﬀect on the proﬁts
dominates welfare for small α˜, whereas for large α˜ the eﬀect on consumer
surplus dominates. Figure 6 depicts the welfare results for retail prices of
zero and a given capacity of the low bidding ﬁrm.
Figure 6: Welfare depending on α˜ for retail prices of zero.
An increase in the level of smart metering from no smart metering at all
(α˜ = 3
2
) does ﬁrst not have an eﬀect on welfare, consumer surplus or proﬁts.
Welfare is constant as long as the degree of smart metering is low enough
and α˜ is above a certain threshold (α˜ >
√
25−8Ki
2
−1) that ensures that ε∗z > 1
and p∗ = r = 0 always hold. Above this threshold the retail market is so
large that the residual monopoly proﬁt is always maximized at the retail
price. For degrees of smart metering below this threshold the high bidding
ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by clearing the market above the retail price for at
least some states of demand realization. Then consumer surplus and welfare
decrease. The loss of consumer surplus due to uncertain prices above the
marginal cost level cannot be compensated by the larger producer surplus
and by the fact that fewer retail customers are sometimes not served. When
smart metering is further extended, the two latter eﬀects start dominating
the ﬁrst and ﬁnally, if all customers are on smart meters the wholesale price
is approaching zero again. In the Bertrand case, when Kj > Ki > 2 = D0,
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welfare is the same with all consumers on smart meters or none at all.
4.2 Intermediate equilibrium retail prices
When the two ﬁrms’ capacities become scarcer the retail price is 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ ,
as described in proposition 2. This retail price is always lower than 1
2
+ ε,
and hence all retail customers demand electricity. The SO might have to
intervene, because Ki +Kj < D(r) is possible for some states of the demand
realization. To focus on the case where ﬁrms clear the market at their bid
and the wholesale price can be either p∗ = p∗j or p
∗ = 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ we introduce
the following condition. As long as
Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1)−Kj = 8 + 2α˜(Kj − 2)− 5Kj
3− 2α˜ (13)
holds, the SO never has to set the price at pˆ > r. Equation (13) ensures that
the two ﬁrms can cover the market at the retail price even for the highest
demand shock. We derive this condition in Appendix C.2 and show that
under this condition ﬁrms are also able to cover all possible states of demand
at the optimal price above the retail price, p∗ = p∗j . Similarly to the case
of zero retail prices we can now argue that whenever the demand shock is
larger than ε∗i the wholesale price becomes p
∗ = p∗j , while for lower demand
shocks the wholesale market price is p∗ = r = 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ . For the derivation of
the critical shock with intermediate retail prices, ε∗i , see Appendix C.1. Con-
sumer surplus and proﬁts can then be calculated equivalently to equations
(11) and (12) respectively. Figure 7 illustrates the welfare results for a given
capacity of the low bidding ﬁrm.
Again, for a large enough α˜ such that only p∗ = r applies, all consumers are
always served and pay the same price no matter whether they are on smart
metering or not. In this case all eﬀects of a variation of α˜ are driven by
the change in the price. Due to ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0, contrary to the case for zero retail
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Figure 7: Welfare depending on α˜ for intermediate retail prices.
prices, consumers like an increase in smart metering because they consume
more and pay less (∂CS
∂α˜
< 0). We ﬁnd that ∂PS
∂α˜
> 0 and that producer
surplus reduces as the level of smart metering increases because despite their
increased electricity consumption consumers pay less. More smart metering
increases welfare (∂W
∂α˜
< 0) because it reduces market power without any con-
sumer being forced to leave the market. When the degree of smart metering
is above the threshold the pivotal ﬁrm, depending on the demand shock,
clears the market at or above the retail price. In this case more smart me-
tering means a decrease in the consumer surplus (∂CS
∂α˜
> 0) and an increase
in the producer surplus (∂PS
∂α˜
< 0). The level of welfare is U-shaped again.
The same arguments that explain the U-shaped eﬀect for zero retail prices
also apply for intermediate retail prices.
4.3 High equilibrium retail prices
The retail price becomes 3−α˜− 1
2
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki for relatively scarce
capacities. Again, if Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1) − Kj holds, the wholesale market
always clears at the optimal bid of the pivotal ﬁrm. We only have wholesale
prices equal to the retail price for low shocks that satisfy ε < ε∗h. For demand
shocks ε∗h < ε < 1 the wholesale price is above the retail price. In Appendix
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C.1 and C.2 we derive ε∗h and the functional form of the market clearing
condition Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1) − Kj, for which the SO does not have to
intervene and set scarcity prices. Opposing to the case of intermediate retail
prices, for high retail prices we can have r > 1
2
+ε and some retail consumers
do not demand electricity. Given the retail price, whether all or only some
retail customers demand electricity depends on the demand shock. Hence for
ε < ε∗h we now derive consumer surplus as
CS =
∫ εf
0
∫ r−ε
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (14)
+
∫ εf
0
∫ α˜
r−ε
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
εf
∫ α˜
1
2
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε,
where εf decides on wheter r > 1
2
+ ε or r < 1
2
+ ε, so on whether the retail
market is partially or fully covered. Since ε < ε∗h and p
∗ = r for all demand
shocks, only the eﬀects of ∂r¯
∂α˜
determine welfare. We again ﬁnd ∂CS
∂α˜
< 0
and ∂W
∂α˜
< 0. More smart metering lowers the market price and increases
consumer surplus and welfare. Producer surplus, that is derived within the
same integrals as in equation (14), decreases as smart metering increases,
however only if the negative eﬀect on proﬁts of the lowered retail price is
oﬀset by the positive eﬀect that for lower retail prices the retail market is
fully covered for more demand realizations. For high Ki, that lead to high
retail prices and relatively greater losses if the retail market is not fully
covered, the latter eﬀect starts dominating and producer surplus becomes
inverted U-shaped in the level of smart metering.
Whenever ε∗h < ε < 1 and the wholesale price changes with the demand
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shock we derive consumer surplus as
CS =
∫ εf
0
∫ r−ε
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (15)
+
∫ εf
0
∫ α˜
r−ε
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ ε∗h
εf
∫ α˜
1
2
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
ε∗h
∫ α˜
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− p∗)− (α− p
∗)2
2
− p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε.
Then like for intermediate retail prices ∂CS
∂α˜
> 0 holds and consumers dislike
smart metering. Producer surplus is increasing in the amount of smart me-
tering, unless the retail price is very high (for low Ki). If Ki is very low,
the retail price is very high and producer surplus becomes slightly U-shaped,
because a suﬃcient number of customers have to be on smart meters to level
out the losses of retailers that pay high prices whenever p = r but leave the
market whenever the demand shock is high and p > r holds. In line with the
case of intermediate retail prices we ﬁnd that welfare is U-shaped whenever
the market outcome changes with the demand realization, while welfare is
increasing if the wholesale market price equals the retail price for all demand
shocks. Overall, the comparative statics of smart metering on welfare for
high retail prices follow the patterns for intermediate retail prices.
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5 Conclusion
This paper derives welfare eﬀects of real-time pricing in electricity markets.
When electricity generating ﬁrms have market power in the wholesale market
and consumers are risk-averse, we show that real-time pricing does not have
to be eﬃciency enhancing. Overall welfare implications depend on the level
of ﬁrms’ capacities and on the magnitude of stochastic demand shocks. With
large capacities that always lead to Bertrand prices, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in
welfare when all or no consumers are on smart meters. When ﬁrms’ capacities
are smaller such that market power arises, ﬁrms can price relatively high in
times of high demand shocks. When this is the case, we show that for the
main cases in which the system operator does not need to intervene and
set prices, real-time pricing decreases consumer surplus, because risk-averse
consumers dislike high and uncertain prices. At the same time real-time
metering increases producer surplus, because more smart metering means
more demand situations in which more wholesale customers pay a price above
marginal costs. These two opposing eﬀects lead to a U-shaped welfare in
smart metering whenever the demand shock can change equilibrium prices.
If however ﬁrms capacities are relatively large and the demand shock does
not change the wholesale price, smart metering can increase consumer surplus
and welfare. Our ﬁndings suggest that, before investing in smart meters and
smart grids, dominant ﬁrm behavior and the welfare gain of ﬁxed retail prices
that insure risk-averse consumers against price ﬂuctuations should be taken
into consideration.
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Appendix
A Proof or proposition 1
A.1 Case (i): Ki > D(0, r, α˜, ε), Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε)
This is the usual Bertrand case because non of the ﬁrms is eﬀectively capacity constrained.
If ﬁrm i bids pi = 0 and ﬁrm j bids pj = 0 with i, j = A,B, none of the two ﬁrms has an
incentive to deviate because they could not improve on their proﬁt of 0. If the ﬁrms bid
pi = pj = p > 0 ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm j’s proﬁt would be identical and given by πi = πj =
1
2pD(p, r, α˜, ε). Then each ﬁrm has an incentive to slightly undercut its rival because then
it could realize instead πi,j = (p−)D(p−, r, α˜, ε) with  → 0. If the ﬁrms bid pi > pj ≥ 0
then ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is zero and ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is πj = pjD(pj , r, α˜, ε). Here ﬁrm i has again
an incentive to slightly undercut ﬁrm j in order to realize πi = (pj − )D(pj − , r, α˜, ε)
with  → 0 instead. Thus pi = pj = 0 is the only Nash equilibrium.
A.2 Case (ii): Ki < D(0, r, α˜, ε), Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε)
Here only ﬁrm i is capacity constrained. Suppose both ﬁrms bid pi = pj = 0 and have
therefore zero proﬁts, then only ﬁrm j has an incentive to deviate to a higher price pj > 0.
If it deviates it would serve the residual demand and would realize πj = pj(D(pj , r, α˜, ε)−
Ki) > 0 if pj were not too high. The optimal deviation would be to choose
p∗j = argmax
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]} . (16)
The same price p∗j would also be a best response of ﬁrm j if ﬁrm i chooses pi with
0 ≤ pi < p∗j such that
(pi − )min{D(pi − , r, α˜, ε),Kj} ≤ p∗j [D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε)−Ki] (17)
with  → 0. The capacity constrained ﬁrm i does never want to deviate to pi > pj because
it could not generate any positive demand for itself this way. The low-bidding ﬁrm j would
serve the whole market and ﬁrm i would not increase its proﬁts.
In order to determine p∗j we need to take into account the diﬀerent cases of the demand
in equation (5) resulting from the situation on the retail market. We need to distinguish
three cases:
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Fully Covered Retail Market (0 ≤ r ≤ 12 + ε): All consumers without real-time pric-
ing have a positive demand. The demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 + ε− ( 32 − α˜)p∗ − (α˜− 12 )r if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ r,
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if r < p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜ + ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε + 32 ,
0 if p∗ > ε + 32 .
(18)
Solving for p∗j yields the following solution
p∗j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
3+2α˜+4ε
8 − Ki3−2α˜ if 0 ≤ Ki < K1,
r if max{0,K1} ≤ Ki < K2,
2+2ε−2Ki−r(2α˜−1)
6−4α˜ if max{0,K2} < Ki < D0,
(19)
where K1, K2 and D0 are deﬁned as
K1 =
(
3
2
− α˜
)(
3 + 2α˜
4
+ ε− 2r
)
(20)
−
√
r(4(2− α˜)α˜− 3)(1 + 2α˜ + 4ε− 4r)
2
,
K2 = 1 + ε−
(
5
2
− α˜
)
r and (21)
D0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) = 1 + ε−
(
α˜− 1
2
)
r. (22)
Partially Covered Retail Market ( 12 + ε < r ≤ α˜ + ε): Some of the consumers with-
out real-time pricing are priced out of the market. The demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗)
+ 12 (α˜ + ε− r)2 if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ r,
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if r < p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜ + ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε + 32 ,
0 if p∗ > ε + 32 .
(23)
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Solving for p∗j here yields the following
p∗j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
r if 0 ≤ Ki < K ′2,
1
2
(
1
2
(
3
2 + α˜
)
+ ε + (α˜+ε−r)
2−2Ki
3−2α˜
)
if max{0,K ′2} < Ki
< D′0,
(24)
where K ′2 and D
′
0 are deﬁned as
K ′2 =
1
2
((
3
2
+ ε
)2
− 2r(3− α˜ + ε) + r2
)
and (25)
D′0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) =
1
2
(
3
2
− α˜
)(
3
2
+ α˜ + 2ε
)
+ (α˜ + e− r)2. (26)
Uncovered Retail Market (r > α˜ + ε): All consumers without real-time prices are priced
out of the market. The Demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if 0 < p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜ + ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε + 32
0 if p∗ > ε + 32 .
(27)
Solving for the the optimal p∗j yields
p∗j =
3 + 2α˜ + 4ε
8
− Ki
3− 2α˜ if 0 < Ki < D
′′
0 , (28)
with p∗j < α˜ + ε < r. D
′′
0 is deﬁned as
D′′0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) =
1
8
(3− 2α˜)(3 + 2α˜ + 4ε). (29)
Note that independent of the speciﬁc case that we are looking at p∗j < a˜+ ε and
∂p∗j
∂Ki
< 0
always holds. Thus, all consumers with real-time pricing have a positive demand at p∗j
and it is never located at the non-linear part of the demand function, see ﬁgure 2. The
equilibrium (pi, pj) = (0, p∗j ) does always exist for this case. In addition condition (17)
is usually satisﬁed for a range of 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i where pi = p¯i satisﬁes the condition with
equality. p¯i is unique because one can show that the left-hand side of (17) is a convex
increasing or single peaked function with at most one point of discontinuity at pi = r for
all pi < p∗j . Given that the condition is never satisﬁed for pi = p
∗
j and always for pi = 0
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there exists a unique 0 ≤ p¯i < p∗j such that condition (17) is satisﬁed for all 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i.
Thus we have multiple Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) and 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i. They are
all pay-oﬀ equivalent and result in a unique auction price p∗ = p∗j .
A.3 Case (iii), (iv) and (v): Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε)
Here both ﬁrms are capacity constrained and both ﬁrms have an incentive to deviate from
pi = pj = 0 because both ﬁrm can beneﬁt from a positive residual demand. Given that
the rival sticks to a price of zero each ﬁrm has an incentive to set
p∗j = argmax
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]} or p∗i = argmax
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Kj ]} . (30)
Like in case (ii) in subsection A.2 this might even be a best response for a positive price
of one’s rival as long as (17) or the equivalent condition for ﬁrm i choosing p∗i holds.
Since both ﬁrms are capacity constrained, bidding a price above p∗j or p
∗
i is potentially
proﬁtable for both ﬁrms. Therefore the Nash equilibria with either (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) with
pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j and p¯i implicitly deﬁned in (17) or (pi, pj) = (p∗i , pj) with pj ≤ p¯j < p∗i and
p¯j implicitly deﬁned in the equivalent to (17) can only exist as long as the low-bidding
ﬁrm does not have an incentive to bid above the high-bidding ﬁrms price level.
Note that p∗j and p
∗
i are still deﬁned by either (19), (24), or (28) or the equivalent equations
for p∗i depending on the retail price level. And no matter which deﬁnition applies we can
show that p∗j ≥ p∗i as long as Kj ≥ Ki. If (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) with pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j holds
and the total capacity in the market is suﬃcient to satisfy D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε), the best pi > p
∗
j
would be pi = p∗j +  with  → 0 for the low-capacity ﬁrm. Then ﬁrm i’s proﬁt would be
(p∗j + )[D(p
∗
j + , r, α˜, ε) −Kj ] and this does never exceed the proﬁt p∗jKi that it would
achieve with pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j . Thus the equilibrium with the low-capacity ﬁrm bidding low
with pi ≤ p¯i and the high-capacity ﬁrm bidding high with pj = p∗j > p¯i always exist for
Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) as long as Ki + Kj ≥ D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε) holds. The latter condition is
equivalent to Ki > Si with
Si =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
4 (
3
2 − α˜)(3 + 2α˜ + 4ε)− 2Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K1,
1 + ε− r −Kj if max{0,K1} ≤ Kj < K2,
1 + ε− (α˜− 12) r − 2Kj if max{0,K2} ≤ Kj < D0,
(31)
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if 0 ≤ r ≤ 12 + ε,
Si =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(3+2ε−2r)2
8 −Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K ′2,
1
8
(
9 + 12ε + 4ε2 + 4r2 − 8(α˜ + ε)r)
−2Kj if max{0,K ′2} ≤ Kj
< D′0,
(32)
if the retail price fulﬁlls 12 + ε < r ≤ α˜ + ε and
Si =
1
8
(
3
2
− α˜
)
(3 + 2α˜ + 4ε)− 2Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < D′′0 , (33)
if α˜ + ε < r.
If we now consider the other potential equilibrium with (pi, pj) = (p∗i , pj) with pj ≤ p¯j <
p∗i , this equilibrium only exists if the high capacity ﬁrm j does not have an incentive to
deviate to a price with pj > p∗i . Since p
∗
j ≥ p∗i holds, the optimal deviation for the high
capacity ﬁrm is given by its p∗j that is deﬁned in (19), (24), or (28), depending on the
relevant retail price level. Checking the proﬁts from choosing p∗j > p
∗
i reveals that this
deviation is not beneﬁcial if Ki ≥ Ki with
Ki =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
8 (9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜ + 2ε)
−4√Kj(9 + 12ε− 8Kj − 4α˜(α˜ + 2ε))) if 0 ≤ Kj < K1
max
{
1
8 (9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜ + 2ε)
−8√2Kjr(3− 2α˜)) , 1 + ε−Kj − r} if min{0,K1}
≤ Kj < K2
max
{
1
8 (3− 2α˜)(3 + 2α˜ + 4ε)
−√Kj(2 + 2ε− 2Kj − r(2α˜− 1)),
2K2j +2(3−2α˜)(1+ε−r)r−Kj(2+2ε−r(α˜−1))
2r(3−2α˜)
}
if min{0,K2}
≤ Kj < D0
(34)
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if 0 ≤ r < 12 + ε,
Ki =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3+2ε−2r
8 −Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K ′2
8K2j +(3−2α˜)(3+2ε−2r)2r−Kj((3+2ε)2−8r(α˜+ε)+4r2)
2r(3−2α˜) if K
′
2 ≤ Kj < K3
1
8
{
9− 8α˜r + 4[ε(3 + ε)− 2εr + r2]
+4
√
Kj
(
9 + 12ε + 4ε2 − 8Kj + 4r2
−8(α˜ + ε)r)1/2
}
if max{K ′2,K3}
≤ Kj < D′0
(35)
if 12 + ε ≤ r < α˜ + ε and
Ki =
1
8
(9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜ + 2ε) (36)
−4
√
Kj(9 + 12ε− 8Kj − 4α˜(α˜ + 2ε))
)
if 0 ≤ Kj < D′′0 ,
if r > α˜ + ε. The parameter K3 in (35) is only relevant as long as K2 > K3 > D′0 holds
and is deﬁned as
K3 =
1
16
(
9 + 12ε + 4ε2 − 8α˜r − 8εr + 4r2 (37)
+
√
−128(3− 2α˜)2r2 + ((3 + 2ε)2 − 8(α˜ + ε)r + 4r2)2
)
. (38)
One can also show that Si ≤ Ki for the relevant ranges of Kj . Thus, the two types
of equilibrium with either (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) and pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j or (pi, pj) = (p∗i , pj) and
pj ≤ p¯j < p∗i exist for Kj ≥ Ki ≥ Ki. For min{Kj ,Ki} > Ki ≥ Si only the equilibria
with (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) and pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j exist. For Ki < Si the total capacity in the
market does not satisfy the total demand at p∗j any more. The system operator will set
the market clearing price pˆ. Both ﬁrms bid a price that does not exceed the anticipated
market clearing price because this would reduce their proﬁt.
B Proof of proposition 2
The retailers will always compete the retail price down to a level where r ≤ p∗ is ensured
for all ε ∈ [0, 1] due to the Bertrand competition among them. From equations (19), (24)
and (28) and the deﬁnition of pˆ from case (v) in Proposition 1 it is obvious that ∂p
∗
∂ε ≥ 0
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for all ε ∈ [0, 1] if p∗ ≥ 0. Thus r ≤ p∗ for all ε implies that r ≤ p∗ for ε = 0.
If Ki < K2 or Ki < K ′2 holds for ε = 0, then the retail price will always satisfy r ≤ p∗.
Alternatively, r ≤ p∗ might also occur for either K2 ≤ Ki < Si, or K ′2 ≤ Ki < Si, if the
system operator needs to set the price pˆ such that it exceeds the retail price for ε = 0.
Let us ﬁrst assume that Ki and Kj are large enough that the system operator does not
need to set a price pˆ for Ki > K2 or Ki > K ′2 such that it exceeds the retail price, then
Ki ≤ K2 or Ki ≤ K ′2 for the smallest ε = 0 is suﬃcient to ensure that r ≤ p∗ for all
ε ∈ [0, 1]. Taking into account p∗ from either (19) or (24) and solving these inequalities
for r yields
r < r′ =
⎧⎨
⎩3− α˜−
1
2
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki if 0 ≤ Ki < 12 (α˜− 12 ),
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ if
1
2
(
α˜− 12
) ≤ Ki < 1. (39)
The split occurs because for Ki < 12 (α˜− 12 ) the retail price threshold r1 exceeds 12 where,
given ε = 0, the retail market is no longer fully covered and the parameter K ′2 instead of K2
becomes relevant. For Kj ≥ Ki ≥ 1 the only possible outcome for the retail competition
is r = 0.
Let us now assume that Ki and Kj are not large enough to avoid the case that the system
operator needs to set a price pˆ ≥ r for some K2 < Ki ≤ Kj or K ′2 < Ki ≤ Kj if ε = 0.
The system operator price, given a fully covered retail market, is
pˆ =
2
(
1−Ki −Kj − r(α˜− 12 )
)
3− 2α˜ . (40)
The system operator price, given a partially covered retail market, is
pˆ =
9− 8Ki − 8Kj − 8α˜r + 4r2
12− 8α˜ . (41)
In order to ensure pˆ ≥ r
r ≤ r′′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
3
2 −
√
2(Ki + Kj) if 0 ≤ Ki < 12 −Kj ,
1−Ki −Kj if 12 −Kj ≤ Ki < 1−Kj ,
(42)
must hold.
Note that we do not need to consider the case where the retail market is uncovered for
ε = 0 because this implies that the retail price is too high for a positive demand of the
retail consumers and would be competed downward by the retail ﬁrms. In addition r′′ is
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only relevant if r′ < r′′ for the given Ki ≤ Kj . Checking for which Ki ≤ Kj the inequality
holds yields the deﬁnition of r¯ in Proposition 2.
C Welfare derivation
C.1 Critical shocks
The critical demand shock, ε∗, that decides on whether the wholesale price is at or above
the retail price can de derived as follows. Because ε∗ determines if Ki is smaller or larger
than K1, we set K1 from equation (20) equal to Ki and solve for ε. This yields
ε∗ = − α˜
2
+
2(Ki + 2r)
3− 2α˜ +
√
2
√
(3− 2α˜)2(2α˜− 1)r(2α˜ + 4Ki + 4r − 3)
(3− 2α˜)2 −
3
4
. (43)
For zero retail prices the critical shock is then
ε∗z =
8Ki + 4α˜2 − 9
12− 8α˜ . (44)
Inserting the intermediate and the high retail prices from proposition 2 in equation (43)
yields the respective critical shocks ε∗i and ε
∗
h.
C.2 Conditions for market clearing
For the welfare analysis to be tractable, we assume that the ﬁrms can always clear the
market and the SO never has to intervene. For retail prices of zero this is given through
the capacity requirements that have to hold for the retail prices to be zero.
For intermediate and high retail prices capacities can be too low and the SO has to set the
market clearing price for some demand shocks. To calculate welfare when the ﬁrms clear
the market at their bids we deﬁne minimum capacity endowments such that the ﬁrms are
able to play p∗ = r or p∗ = p∗j .
Intermediate retail price are always below 12 and hence below
1
2 +ε and therefore the retail
market is always fully covered. Capacities have to fulﬁll Ki + Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1), where
r < 12 + ε, and Ki + Kj ≥ D(p∗j | ε = 1). Rearranging the ﬁrst condition yields
Ki ≥ 8 + 2α˜(Kj − 2)− 5Kj3− 2α˜ . (45)
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Because r < p∗j and hence D(r | ε = 1) > D(p∗j | ε = 1), whenever equation (45) is
satisﬁed, the ﬁrms can also cover the market at all optimal prices higher than the retail
price.
Likewise, for high retail prices, capacities have to fulﬁll Ki + Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1) and
Ki + Kj ≥ D(p∗j | ε = 1). When ε = 1, r < 12 + ε = 32 always holds for high retail prices
and the retail market is always fully covered. When r < 12 + ε and all retail customers
demand electricity the ﬁrms capacities have to satisfy Ki+Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1) what implies
Ki
{
≥ α˜−Kj + 12
√
4(α˜− 4)α˜− 8Kj + 23 if Ki > − 12 (α˜− 6)α˜− 238
≤ α˜−Kj − 12
√
4(α˜− 4)α˜− 8Kj + 23 if Ki < − 12 (α˜− 6)α˜− 238
(46)
If the ﬁrms can cover all demand at the retail price when the retail market is fully covered,
they can also cover the reduced demand for a partially covered retail market and the
wholesale market at optimal prices above the retail price. Figure 8 illustrates the area
that equations (45) and (46) deﬁne.


Ki
Kj
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
1
1
2
(
α˜ − 12
)
r = 0
45◦
r = 3− α˜ − 12
√·
r =
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜
Figure 8: Combinations of Ki and Kj that ensure p = r or p = p∗j .
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This paper employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in
multiunit uniform price procurement auctions when ﬁrms are capacity
constrained. Using data from the New York City capacity auctions, I
ﬁnd that capacity constrained ﬁrms use simple bidding strategies to
co-ordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high rents for all bidders.
I show theoretically and empirically that the largest bidder submits
the auction clearing bid, while all other bidders submit inframarginal
bids that are low enough to not be proﬁtably undercut. Inframarginal
bidders react to capacity endowments and decrease their bids as the
largest ﬁrm’s capacities and its proﬁts of undercutting increase.
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1 Introduction
The volume of goods traded through auctions in the economy has been dras-
tically increasing over the last decades. This increased use of auctions raises
the need to better understand and predict economic behavior in bid based
selling mechanisms. To address this challenge, an increasing strand of lit-
erature tests and expands existing auction models. Because electricity is a
completely homogeneous good and produced by a small number of ﬁrms,
restructured power markets have become a major ﬁeld of applied auction
analysis. Multiunit auctions are the main auction format used in electric-
ity markets. This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that
a simple model of multiunit uniform price auctions is consistent with ob-
served bidding data from capacity auctions in electricity markets. Harbord
and Von der Fehr (1993), LeCoq (2002), Crampes and Creti (2005), Fabra
et al. (2006) and more recently Fabra et al. (2011) developed a multiunit auc-
tion framework in which capacity constrained bidders with constant marginal
costs compete in electricity auctions. I focus on an extended version of Fabra
et al. (2006) and, using data from the New York Independent System Op-
erator (NYISO) capacity auctions, ﬁnd that these models are suﬃcient to
predict economic bidding behavior in multiunit auctions when bidders are
capacity constrained.
By tailoring a multiunit auction model to the NYISO capacity market this
paper also reveals design ﬂaws in this market and contributes to the discus-
sion on supply security and electricity market design. Generating ﬁrms in
the NYISO capacity market co-ordinated on an equilibrium play that was
extracting the highest possible rents for the supply side between 2003 and
2008. The capacity market was always clearing at the price cap and thus set
incorrect price signals for entry and proﬁtability of new peaking units.
The economic theory of multiunit auctions dates back to the auctions of
share framework by Wilson (1979). Klemperer and Meyer (1989) increased
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the predictive power of Wilson’s model by introducing demand uncertainty
thereby reducing the multiplicity of equilibria substantially. Green and New-
berry (1992) were the ﬁrst to tailor a multiunit auction model to electricity
markets and designed the model to describe the UK spot market for electric-
ity. Early tests of these models by Wolfram (1998) and Green and Newberry
(1992) conﬁrmed the models’ predictions. More recent structural empirical
work by Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Oren and Sioshansi (2007) and also
by Wolak (2000) provided additional support for the main models, extended
them by including forward markets, and introduced non-parametric tests.
So far, empirical ﬁndings for simple multiunit auction models in the style
of Fabra et al. (2006) are not documented, which is partly due to the styl-
ized nature of these models. Capacity auctions take place in an environment
very close to the one assumed in Fabra et al. (2006) and are ideal to deliver
empirical insights on the predictions of such models.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the market struc-
ture in the New York electricity market. Section 3 introduces a model
for multiunit uniform price procurement auctions with capacity constrained
ﬁrms that reﬂects the market design discussed in section 2. Section 4 dis-
cusses the empirical ﬁndings. I compare the optimal bids generated by the
model to observed bids in the auction, assess deviations from the model,
and present estimates of the best response functions. Section 6 concludes on
the contribution and limitations of my empirical ﬁndings and draws policy
recommendations for future market designs of capacity markets.
2 The New York capacity market
This section sketches the market design of the New York ISO energy market.
The New York power market consists of an energy market and a capacity
market. In virtually all other markets, pricing the commodity only is suﬃ-
cient to promote long run investment. Hence most markets do not need to
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price capacity. In electricity markets, the existence of dominant ﬁrms and
the absence of a robust demand response requires that in times of shortage
the market price is set administratively. When this price cap is set just above
marginal costs (for mostly political reasons this is the case is in all major
US electricity markets), electricity prices are a weak signal for promoting ef-
ﬁcient long run investment. Capacity markets, as they are installed in most
markets along the US east coast, supplement the lost revenues, termed ’miss-
ing money’, that result from the price cap in the energy market. By allowing
ﬁrms to obtain revenue from holding capacity, regulators get to keep elec-
tricity shortage prices at a politically acceptable level and to secure long run
investment in electricity generation at the same time.1
Capacity markets are artiﬁcially created markets that signal the scarcity of
aggregate generation capacities relative to future projected power demand.
Projected demand for generating capacity is estimated, announced and pro-
cured by the system operator, who ﬁnances the costs of procurement by
passing them on to retailers. When generation capacities are scarce, capac-
ity market rents are high. When there is relatively large market capacity,
the capacity market price is low and does not promote further investment.
Firms who earn capacity payments must oﬀer to produce power, that is,
they must supply a bid below the energy market price cap in the electric-
ity wholesale auction. In the purest form the energy price cap is set at the
marginal cost of peaking units, so all rents for peaking units are made in
the capacity market. Oﬀ-peak units with lower marginal costs earn revenues
in the energy and the capacity market. The capacity market imitates the
revenues for peaking units that would be earned in an energy-only market in
times when the market price would be above the price cap. The overarching
policy goal of capacity markets is to protect consumers from market power,
while maintaining suﬃcient peak production and investment incentives in
1This market design is highly debated. For an analysis of energy-only markets see
Hogan (2005).
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new peak capacity despite the price cap.
The New York state electricity market serves about 20 million ﬁnal customers
and had a peak demand of about 33 GW in 2010, whereas total generating
capacity was at about 41 GW.2 The New York state wide wholesale elec-
tricity exchange is organized by the NYISO, who in addition administers a
monthly capacity market. Each month ﬁrms bid their available capacity into
the capacity market and thereby, if they are procured, oblige themselves to
oﬀer energy in the energy market during the following month. If generation
capacity is scarce relative to the ISO’s demand for generating and reserve
capacity, these markets then generate rents for ﬁrms to cover ﬁxed costs of
currently running peakers and signal the proﬁtability of new entry.
To set locationally diﬀerent signals, the ISO runs three separate capacity
markets with diﬀerent demand curves for New York City, Long Island, and
the remaining area of New York state. The data used to empirically assess the
auction model comes from the capacity market in New York City. To account
for diﬀerent summer and winter peak demand, the ISO ﬁxes the demand for
capacity every six month, while the procurement takes place each month.
Each month the New York City capacity spot market clears around 8.5 GW
at a capacity price of 7 $/kw-month during winter months and at around 12
$/kw-month during the summer period. Retailers are the ﬁnal consumers of
capacity rights. The ISO obliges retailers to hold capacity rights according to
the projected electricity demand of their retail customers. Retailers can also
buy capacity rights on bilateral and institutional forward markets. Retailers
buy capacity in the forward markets, notify their position to the ISO, who
then procures the missing capacity as a single buyer in the ﬁnal spot auction
and resells the capacity rights to the retailers at the auction clearing price.
Winning ﬁrms in the capacity market have to bid into the energy market
2See www.nyiso.com. After several years of high capacity prices and new investment in
capacities before 2010, this reserve margin is projected to be suﬃcient until 2018 according
to the 2009 Reliable Need Assessment of NYISO.
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and deliver at the prevailing energy market price. The NYISO’s energy
market software employs an automated market power mitigation procedure
for energy market bids that are signiﬁcantly higher than previously submitted
bids from the same generation unit during, for example, competitive low
demand periods. Hence it is not possible for ﬁrms to earn capacity payments
and withhold rewarded capacity in the energy market by bidding above the
clearing price of the electricity wholesale auction.
The model introduced in the next section is built upon a full information
framework to describe the spot market capacity auction run by the NYISO.
The model assumes that ﬁrms know their rival’s forward position result-
ing from bilateral or institutional forward trading of capacity rights. Hence
what we observe in the spot market are best response functions to what
ﬁrms already sold forward. Given the repeated nature of the auction, this
assumption seems realistic.3 In 2009, the NYISO estimated that approxi-
mately 45% of the capacity requirements are transacted through the NYISO
administered capacity auctions, at an annual volume of over $850 million.
The remaining requirements were met through forward contracts that hedge
around the spot market capacity price. A look at the forward and spot prices
for capacity reveals that the law of one price holds with respect to all forward
market transactions.4
3 The model
To analyze the data I use a simple model of bidding behavior in multiu-
nit uniform price procurement auctions. The model builds on the auction
3Between 2006 and 2008 a ﬁnancial hedge between two participants in the auction
existed. This agreement changed their forward market behavior and was judged to violate
the Sherman Act by the Department of Justice. However, the agreement was common
information and is in line with the assumption that each ﬁrm know its rivals forward
position.
4See the ICAP summary section at www.nyiso.com.
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framework in Fabra et al. (2006), who derive equilibrium outcomes in a va-
riety of multiunit auction settings. The NYISO market clears as a multiunit
uniform price procurement auction, where the ISO announces the demand
schedule and generating ﬁrms submit supply bids. The auctioneer, the ISO,
announces a linear downward sloping demand function, D(p), that is known
to all bidders prior to the auction.5 I assume that all bidders i = 1, ..., N
are capacity constrained so that no bidder has enough available capacity, k¯i,
to serve entire demand at a price of zero. Firms can bid a discrete, possibly
stepwise, supply function si(b), that speciﬁes how much capacity a ﬁrm is
willing to sell at a price of b. Hence, if ﬁrms submit just one bid step, their
supply function si(b) would be (b, k¯i). If a ﬁrm submits two or more steps,
the supply function would split up k¯i and submit this capacity at two or more
diﬀerent price bids. I assume that ﬁrms submit all their available constrained
capacities, k¯i, and provide the condition for which it is indeed optimal to oﬀer
all capacity up to the constraint in Appendix A.1. The auctioneer orders all
bids, independent of who submitted them, in increasing order and ﬁnds the
market clearing price, pc, which satisﬁes the condition
M∑
j=1
Sj(p
c) = D(pc), (1)
where the index j denotes on bid step j = 1, ...,M in the aggregate bid
function Sj(b). The auctioneer sums up all capacity submitted at each price
bid and ﬁnds the market clearing price. All bids that are lower than the
market clearing price will be procured and paid the market clearing price. I
drop time indices for each auction. For each auction, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are
πi = si(p
c)pc. (2)
5In practice, this spot demand function is the total demand for capacity minus all
quantities that retailers contracted bilaterally or on forward auctions.
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Marginal costs are assumed to be constant and zero. Firms do not face no-
table costs of oﬀering their capacity on the capacity market. Cramton and
Stoft (2005) show that for all ﬁrms that plan to sell electricity in the energy
market, it is not costly to commit to that in the capacity market. Further-
more, Stoft (2002) shows that capacity markets clear at market prices close
to zero in times of overcapacity, which indicates that marginal costs are in-
signiﬁcant. These two features, capacity constraints and constant marginal
costs, have signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrms’ strategy choice. When ﬁrms are
unconstrained or face increasing marginal costs, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by
bidding upward sloping supply functions against all residual demand situa-
tions. However, when ﬁrms are capacity constrained and do not face increas-
ing marginal costs (that force them to bid upward sloping bid functions),
simpler strategies suﬃce. Inframarginal ﬁrms cannot serve their residual de-
mand and only one pivotal ﬁrm clears the auction on the margin against its
residual demand. Then, proﬁts of the inframarginal bidders do not change
whether they submit upward sloping supply functions or simply submit all
their available capacity at some price below the market clearing price, and
are rewarded at the clearing price. Only one high and pivotal bidder clears
the market in each auction.
Firm’s strategies can be described as follows. For the auction to clear, the
auctioneer sorts all price bids bj, where j = 1, ...,M , in increasing order.
Accordingly, denote the bid ranking such that b1 < b2 < ... < bM . At
each bj a cumulated capacity of Kj =
∑j
s=1 kj is oﬀered, where kj is the
capacity oﬀered at each bj. There is one pivotal, marginal bidder, i = m,
who oﬀers the marginal bid, bj = bm, that clears the auction and Km−1 <
D(bm−1) ∧ Km ≥ D(bm) holds. The pivotal bidder m maximizes over
the residual demand that all other inframarginal and low bidding capacity
constrained ﬁrms leave unsatisﬁed. In the NYISO capacity market a price
cap is imposed and therefore the pivotal bidder maximizes proﬁts by ﬁnding:
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b∗m = min{argmax
b
b (D(b)−Km−1) , bcap}. (3)
The pivotal bidder submits the optimal residual monopoly bid, if not bound
by the bid cap, and will earn proﬁts of πm. These proﬁts are considered by
the low bidding ﬁrms when choosing their strategy. They choose, si(b), their
inframarginal bids, such that they are low enough to not be undercut by the
pivotal bidder. We can derive upper bounds for all bids of the low bidding
ﬁrms, bj < bm. Each bid j faces an upper bound, b¯j, that solves
b¯j :=
{
bj (D(bj)−Kj−1) = πm if k¯m > D(bj)−Kj−1
bˆj k¯m = πm if D(bj)−Kj−1 > k¯m and bj ≤ bˆj.
(4)
The ﬁrst case in equation (4) describes all bids that, when sligthly underbid
by the pivotal ﬁrm, are pushed out of the market. In this case the pivotal
ﬁrm stays pivotal. The second case deﬁnes upper bounds for bids that, when
slightly underbid by the pivotal ﬁrm, stay in the market. It is possible that
auctions clear and bids only face upper bounds according to the ﬁrst case.
This happens when the pivotal bidder’s capacity, k¯m, is large enough to push
all bids out of the market. If the pivotal bidder cannot push all bids out of
the market, then there is at most one bid, bˆj, that, when undercut, becomes
pivotal and clears the auction. All bids bj ≤ bˆj then face the same upper
bound as the highest bid for which D(bj)−Kj−1 > k¯m holds, because if the
pivotal ﬁrm does not want to underbid that particular bid (and sell all its
capacity k¯m), then the pivotal ﬁrm also does not want to underbid lower bids
bj ≤ bˆj, still sell k¯m, and potentially decrease the auction price.
Not deﬁned in equation (4) are cases in which the auction does not clear,
Km < D(bm), because capacity constraints are too tight. The auctioneer
then would ﬁnd the auction price that ensures Km = D(p). In this case
there is no strategic relation in the ﬁrms’ bids. As described, there is, if
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at all, only one bid (the highest for which D(bj) − Kj−1 > k¯m holds) that
determines the bound for all bids that cannot be pushed out of the market
by the pivotal ﬁrm. In the remainder, such bids are denoted bIj . In each
auction there are, if at all, one or more bids for which k¯m > D(bj) − Kj−1
holds. Bids that fall into this category will be denoted by bIIj . If they exist,
lower bids for which D(bj)−Kj > k¯m holds are optimal by deﬁnition if the
bid bIj is below its bound.
Figure 1 describes an example of the equilibrium play described above. This
example has four bids, meaning maximum four ﬁrms but potentially less if
one or more ﬁrms submitted a stepwise function. The pivotal ﬁrm, i = m,
submits the highest bid and sets the auction clearing price. The pivotal
ﬁrm simply clears the market by optimizing as a monopolist over its residual
demand, see equation (3). The high bidding ﬁrm is bound however by the
price cap and chooses the minimum out of the optimal residual monopoly
price and the price cap. All low bidding ﬁrms submit bids, bj ∈ [0, b¯j], such
that they will not be undercut, according to equation (4). The second highest
bid, b3, has an upper bound that solves bj (D(bj)−Kj−1) = πm. In this case
the capacity of the pivotal bidder is large enough to completely push bid
three out of the market. However, already the second lowest bid, b2, given
its position in the merit order in this example, will still be among the winning
bids when undercut by the pivotal ﬁrm. When the pivotal ﬁrm underbids
and submit b2 −  it cannot cover the whole residual demand and bid b2 will
set the auction clearing price. Firm m then would sell all its capacity, hence
for b2 the upper bound is b¯ =
πm
km
. For, b1, the bound is the same bound
as for b2. All bids below b2 will never be underbid, because if they are, the
underbidding pivotal ﬁrm will potentially decrease the market price and still
sell all its capacity, compared to the price it obtains when only underbidding
b2.
Last, what is not graphed above is the case when the auction does not clear.
This happens in the data, because the capacity constraints are very tight
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Figure 1: Example of the auction clearing.
in some auctions. Since the system operator would set the price such that
D(p) = KM , ﬁrms then just have to bid below that price, otherwise they
would not be procured at all. The equilibria described above are summarized
by the ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 In the multiunit uniform price procurement auction with ca-
pacity constrained ﬁrms, the equilibrium in pure strategies is characterized by
one pivotal ﬁrm who submits the auction clearing bid, while all other bidders
submit low inframarginal bids bj ∈ [0, b¯j], if D(b∗M) ≤ KM .
Proof. See equations (3) and (4) and note that the pivotal bidder does not
want to deviate by construction. If low bidders want to deviate and overbid,
these particular equilibria do not exist. 
There exist multiple equilibria, in which diﬀerent ﬁrms can be the pivotal
bidder. The multiplicity of equilibria is common to the general supply func-
tion framework and also to Fabra et al. (2006). In Appendix A.2, I show
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that equilibria in which the largest ﬁrm is the pivotal bidder always exist
and smaller bidders never want to overbid. Furthermore, in Appendix A.3 I
prove that for very asymmetric ﬁrm capacities the largest ﬁrm never wants
to be among the low bidding ﬁrms and becomes the pivotal bidder, as stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When capacity endowments are suﬃciently asymmetric, only
equilibria exist, in which the largest ﬁrm is the pivotal bidder and submits b∗m,
while all smaller ﬁrms submit low bids bj ∈ [0, b¯j] and do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to overbid b∗m.
Proof: See Appendix A.3. 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is straightforward. Suppose the by far
largest ﬁrm is bidding a low inframarginal price. Then, the residual demand is
relatively low and therefore also the auction clearing residual monopoly price
that one of the smaller ﬁrms would bid. Hence, the largest ﬁrm increases its
proﬁts by overbidding and increasing the market price, even if it then might
not sell all its capacity. In the case of two ﬁrms, a ﬁrm that owns enough
capacities to act as a monopolist would not mind an inﬁnitesimal small ﬁrm
entering the auction, and would still bid close to its monopoly price. In turn,
the small ﬁrm would never overbid the large ﬁrms monopoly price.6
To empirically analyze how the best response functions are describing the
low bids, bi < bm, I employ equation (4). Changing the inequality of the
bound to an equality and taking the log yields:
6Note that for this equilibrium structure introducing stochastic quantity oﬀers of the
ﬁrms and hence stochastic residual demand can only be done for a relatively low support
of random capacity oﬀers. When the support of the residual demand becomes too large,
low bidding ﬁrm’s might ﬁnd themselves setting the market price and in this event like
to price high and increase proﬁts. This eﬀect leads to mixed strategies, see Fabra et al.
(2006). Mixed strategies complicate the analysis signiﬁcantly. This observation together
with the existence of common and zero marginal costs further support the simple full
information framework.
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ln(bj) = ln(πm)− ln(k¯m) (5)
for all bids for which D(bj)−Kj−1 > k¯m holds and
ln(bj) = ln(πm)− ln (D(bj)−Kj−1) (6)
if k¯m > D(bj) − Kj−1 holds. Versions of these equations will be estimated
to see how low bids react to changing pivotal capacity. The model suggests
that inframarginal bids increase as pivotal proﬁts become larger, while infra-
marginal bids decrease if the larger ﬁrms proﬁts of undercutting, that is its
sold quantity when undercutting, k¯m or D(bj)−Kj−1, increases.
The next section, section 3, presents the data. Section 4 tests the two propo-
sitions derived above. Like in Hortacsu and Puller (2008), the analysis starts
by simply deriving the percentage of cases in which ﬁrms behaved as pre-
dicted by the model. I ﬁrst asses the optimality of the pivotal ﬁrms proﬁts,
and then count how often inframarginal bidders violated their bounds. Last,
I present the results for the estimations of the best response functions in
equations (5) and (6).
4 Data and method
This section presents the data and describes the implementation of the model.
The data consist of 56 monthly procurement auctions for installed capacity
in the New York City ISO electricity market from June 2003 to March 2008.7
We do not consider auctions after summer 2008, because in May 2008 the
NYISO implemented a new regulatory regime that introduced the possibility
for the ISO to buy from the pivotal bidder withheld capacity at a default
7Bid data from November 2003 was not available. Auction 1 is June 2003, auction 56
is the February 2008 capacity auction for making capacity available in March 2008.
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price. For each capacity auction, the functional form of the demand curve, all
bids and a unique bidder ID are available. Table 1 shows selected descriptive
auction statistics.
mean min max
number of bidders 15.3 3 35
number of bids 19.7 4 63
oﬀer share largest ﬁrm 66.8% 35.8% 85.3%
oﬀer share two largest ﬁrms 88.0% 66.2% 99.8%
oﬀer share three largest ﬁrms 93.7% 83.7% 100%
Table 1: Auction statistics.
On average 15.3 bidders participated in each auction and submitted around
20 bids (where ﬁrm individual stepwise bid functions are decomposed into
separate bids at each price). The number of bidders rises over time. In
the ﬁrst auctions, only a few ﬁrms, among them the overall larger bidders,
participated. The new bidders were small bidders, potentially retailers, who
bought too many capacity rights in the forward markets and then sold their
excess capacity rights. As table 1 illustrates the largest oﬀer per bidder in
each auction was on average 66.8 % of all oﬀered capacity. Together with the
second largest bidder, the oﬀer share of the two largest ﬁrms already cover
on average 88 % of all oﬀers. The three largest ﬁrms nearly account for all
oﬀered capacity. These numbers indicate that the auction outcome will be
determined in the game with two or three bidders.8 For ten auctions the ISO
had to clear the market, because available capacity was not large enough to
clear the auction.
The implementation of the model proceeds in several steps.9 First, I check
8During the period of this study, the major players in the New York electricity market
have been Keyspan, NRG, ConEd and Reliant. The largest bidder is with very high
probability Keyspan.
9I used matlab to program each step and apply it to the data.
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each auction to see if inframarginal bidders are indeed capacity constrained,
and if it is optimal for them to submit all their capacity, as derived in Ap-
pendix A.1. Then, for each auction, I ﬁnd the pivotal bidder, subtract all
capacity oﬀered by lower bids than the pivotal bid from the demand curve,
and calculate the optimal residual monopoly price. I compare this theoret-
ically optimal price to the observed market clearing bid. This comparison
shows how close the pivotal ﬁrm was to its proﬁt maximizing market clearing
bid. I use the theoretically optimal auction clearing bid to calculate the high
bidders proﬁts in each auction. I use these proﬁts to back out upper bounds
for the low bids as characterized in equation (4). Then I discuss how these
bounds describe the observed low bidding patterns. Last, I use the generated
data on the pivotal ﬁrms proﬁts and the observed data on the demand curve,
the capacity and bid oﬀers to estimate diﬀerent versions of the best response
functions in equations (5) and (6).
5 Results
This section presents the results. I look ex post at the equilibria in each
auction, implement the model, and compare the model to the observed bids.
In other words, I check if deviation was proﬁtable for some bidders and hence
if the ﬁrms did not play within the equilibrium as outlined above.
5.1 Capacity constraints
Only the oﬀers and not the endowment of capacity (that remains from their
forward capacity market commitments) are observable in the data. Therefore
Appendix A.1 derives a theoretical limit on the optimal aggregate capacity
that would be bid by all inframarginal bidders. If all capacity submitted
by the inframarginal bidders is less than this limit, each ﬁrm could gain by
increasing its capacity oﬀer. In the data, aggregate inframarginal capacity is
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always below the limit, which shows that each inframarginal ﬁrm could gain
by oﬀering more capacity. This fact allows us to focus on the price game
as described in the model section without modeling a capacity market stage
prior to the price game. The fact that low bidding ﬁrms must be capacity
constrained also becomes visible when looking at the optimal pivotal bid
discussed below.
5.2 The pivotal bidder
As theoretically derived in proposition 2, the pivotal ﬁrm bids the largest
amount of capacity. This also holds in the data, in each auction over all
years. The largest bidder in table 1 is the pivotal bidder. Hence, ﬁrms
played an equilibrium as described in proposition 2. When assessing the
bidding strategy of the pivotal bidder, the price cap constrains the analy-
ses. When the optimal price is above the price cap, we cannot compare the
optimal bid to the observed bid, but only state that the ﬁrm behaved opti-
mally in submitting the price cap. This lowers the value of the comparison.
Since the price cap was indeed binding, the pivotal ﬁrm always submitted
the price cap in all auctions. This is in line with the model’s prediction.
Figure 2 shows that the unconstrained optimal price was (with four minor
exceptions) above the price cap, and hence the pivotal bidder maximized
proﬁts by submitting a bid at the price cap. In the early years of the market
optimal residual monopoly prices were signiﬁcantly above the price cap. As
the market capacity increased over time, the optimal high bid declines and
during summer months almost equaled the price cap in the later auctions.
Figure 2 also reveals the constrained nature of the low bidding ﬁrms. Es-
pecially in the early auctions bids below the pivotal bid could have oﬀered
more capacity without decreasing the auction price.
Figure 2 also shows that the regulatory bid cap, which was around 7 $/kw-
month during winter months and at around 12 $/kw-month during the sum-
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Figure 2: Modeled and observed high bids for auctions June 2003 to March 2008.
mer period, is signiﬁcantly constraining the bid in the ﬁrst auctions, while
in the later auctions it did not substantially constrain the high bidder. The
strategic importance of the price cap also adds to the debate among pol-
icymakers on whether capacity market demand should be linear and price
elastic or completely inelastic, see e.g. The Brattle Group (2009). The above
results illustrate that clearing prices for capacity do not necessarily change
depending on whether demand is elastic or completely inelastic, if the price
cap is binding in both cases.
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5.3 Inframarginal bids
This subsection compares to what extent the observed bids fall into the
bounds derived in equation (4). Bids for which D(bj) − Kj−1 > k¯m holds
are denoted by bIj , while the bound for those bids is denoted by b¯
I . Bids
for which D(bj) − Kj−1 ≤ k¯m holds are denoted by bIIj , while the bounds
for those bids are denoted by b¯IIj . The comparison shows that the bounds
ﬁt the observed low bids to a high degree. In total, in the 56 auctions 1100
bids were submitted. Not accounting for 239 bids that were submitted when
capacities were very scarce and the ISO had to set the price, 861 bids were
submitted in total when the auction was cleared. Of these 861 bids, 96 bids
came from the pivotal ﬁrm, leaving 765 inframarginal bids. Eventually, of
these 765 inframarginal bids, 346 are bids that follow bounds b¯IIj and 40,
that follow bounds b¯I , while 379 bids were bids below bIj , that all face the
same bound determined by b¯I . As the next table shows, only the bids bIj
show signiﬁcant deviations from the model. In 15% of all cases, the ﬁrms bid
above the bound b¯I . However, 12.5% percentage points of those violations
come from the ﬁrst ﬁve auction rounds. It can be conjectured that ﬁrms
learned over time, and lowered their bid accordingly. Neglecting the ﬁrst
ﬁve auction rounds, more than 95% of all strategic inframarginal bids can be
explained by the model. Table 2 lists the percentage of observed bids that
are higher than their modelled bounds.
Bound Frequency Violations in %
b¯I 40 15 %
b¯IIj 346 4.6 %
b¯I and b¯IIj 386 5.6 %
Table 2: Frequencies and violations of bounds.
While in some auctions many ﬁrms simply bid the lowest possible bid of
zero, in other auctions a lot of capacity is oﬀered at higher prices close to
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the bounds. Figure 3 shows the example of auction number 40, and plots the
bounds and the optimal high bid.
Figure 3: Auction 40 and calculated bounds for the bids.
In this auction the optimal monopoly price and the observed ﬁrm’s bid (the
dashed line) were the price cap. The gray lines are the low bids. A lot of
capacity was submitted at prices close to zero. The thick black lines plot
the bounds for inframarginal capacities. In this particular auction all ﬁrms
submitted bids below the bounds. The largest inframarginal bid, in terms of
capacity, was submitted at a price of 0.5$/kw-month, whereas this bid could
have been submitted up to a bid of around 7$/kw-month to not be proﬁtably
undercut by the pivotal ﬁrm.
5.3.1 Best response function regressions
While like in auction 40 most of the low bids were submitted at relatively
low levels below the bound, over all auctions a lot of bids were submitted
just below the bound. Figure 4 shows a histogram of each bids’ diﬀerence to
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its bound. At 0, the bid was zero, while at 100, the submitted bid was equal
to its bound. Values above 100 signal the percentage of bids that violated
their bound, as described in table 2.
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Figure 4: Density bid-bound ratio.
The histogram in ﬁgure 4 only depicts bids that fall in the categories of b¯I and
b¯II , and shows that ﬁrms chose to submit bids at the ends of the support of
its allowed interval bj ∈ [0, b¯j]. In the following I use the fact that a number
of bids were submitted just below the bound.
I use the best response functions in equations (5) and (6) with the observed
bids instead of their modeled bounds. Note that in each auction, there can
only be one bid that satisﬁes the conditions for bIj , and thus we only have a
very small number of observations to estimate equation (5). However, results
for estimating bIj are supported by the estimation results for the model in
equation (6), which are presented below and are based on a suﬃcient number
of observations. For testing equation (5), I regress the log of the bid bIj on the
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log of pivotal bidders proﬁts and the log of the pivotal bidders capacity in
each auction.10 I add the reservation price, denoted by p(0), of each auction
and a dummy for winter months to control for the level of demand, because
otherwise a higher demand would simply inﬂate proﬁts and bids alike. For
equation (5) I estimate
ln(bIj) = β0 + β1ln(πm) + β2ln(km) + β3ln(p(0)) + β4DW . (7)
Column one in table 3 presents the regression results. The coeﬃcients show a
signiﬁcant and positive relation of low bids, ln(bIj), to pivotal proﬁts, ln(πm).
When the pivotal bidder earns more proﬁts, undercutting becomes less at-
tractive, and the low bidding ﬁrms can submit higher prices. The regression
also shows that the more capacity the high bidder has available, ln(km),
the lower is the bid by inframarginal bidders. When the high bidder holds
large capacities, undercutting is more proﬁtable and inframarginal bidders
decrease their bids.
Similar results are shown in the results for bids that belong to the bound
b¯II . Here, in each auction several bids could have a bound according to b¯II .
Besides the variables derived from equation (6) I add the reservation price
again. The dummy is excluded since all these bids occur in summer months.
I estimate
ln(bIIj ) = β0 + β1ln(πm) + β2ln (D(bj)−Kj−1) + β3ln(p(0)). (8)
Results can be found in the second column in the regression table 3 in the
tables section. Again, now with a suﬃcient number of observations, the
intuition is conﬁrmed. When the large bidder has relatively higher residual
demand when underbidding, ln (D(bj)−Kj−1), low bids are decreasing to
make underbidding less proﬁtable. To conﬁrm the validity I re-run the second
model only with bids that were submitted at above 70% of their bound. These
10Because bids can be exactly zero, I normalize the log of the bids to log(bids+2).
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(1) (2)
ln(bIj ) ln(b
II
j )
ln(πm) 2.046∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(11.14) (31.87)
ln(km) -2.150∗∗∗
(-12.33)
ln(p(0)) 0.596∗∗ 0.160∗∗
(3.06) (2.96)
DW 0.696∗∗∗
(5.09)
ln (D(bj)−Kj−1) -1.521∗∗∗
(-34.39)
cons -3.780∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗
(-3.70) (10.21)
N 40 346
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: Regression results for low bidders’ best response functions.
regressions support the above results and can be found in Appendix B.
5.3.2 Proﬁt equivalence of low bids
As shown in the model section multiple equilibria exist, in which bj ∈ [0, b¯j]
holds and inframarginal ﬁrms can bid any bid in between zero and their
bound. Low bidding ﬁrms’ proﬁts are independent of their own bid as long
as they bid low enough to not be undercut. The model disregards other
strategic behavior among inframarginal bidders. To conﬁrm the strategic
independence among inframarginal bidders there should be no diﬀerence in
the level of the bid depending on other bidder characteristics such as ﬁrm
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size. Figure 5 plots the bid-bound ratio over submitted capacity. Firms
that submitted relatively small capacity might be retailers reselling capacity
rights. Observations to the far out on the x-axis are bids submitted by larger
ﬁrms.
Figure 5: Bid-bound ratio over submitted capacity.
As ﬁgure 5 shows, there is no relation between the level of the bid and the
submitted capacity, supporting the model and the proﬁt equivalence among
bids between zero and their bound.
5.4 Counterfactuals
5.4.1 No capacity withholding
Capacity markets should reward the true aggregate market capacity. As
shown, gaming in this auction leads to signiﬁcant withholding by the pivotal
bidder. The auction price is too high relative to the actual capacity scarcity.
As a counterfactual I calculate the auction price that would occur if all
capacity was submitted to the auction, and the pivotal player would not
withhold any capacity. I ﬁnd the hypothetical auction price, ph, that fulﬁlls
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D(ph) = KM . Then I apply this hypothetical price on the full demand curve
(spot and forward markets). Subtracting the ’no withholding market volume’
from the real and observed market volume yields the potential savings. If the
market would have rewarded capacity according to the true capacity scarcity
the cumulative ﬁrms’ rents would decrease on average by about $415 million a
year. The ISO would then procure the full market capacity at about 40% less
of the costs.11 A comparison of the realized auction price and the calculated
auction price if all capacity was submitted is shown in ﬁgure 6.
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Figure 6: Real and counterfactual clearing price.
From ﬁgure 6 we can conjecture that high capacity prices in the early years of
the market resulted in an increase in capacity over the years and hence the
hypothetical market price without withholding falls over time, taking into
account diﬀerent demand in summer and winter periods.12
11This counterfactual is robust to the assumption of zero costs as long as the hypothetical
market clearing price is above the marginal costs.
12I do not have an explanation for auction 8, in which compared to other auctions in
that year more capacity entered the auction and could have resulted in a clearing price of
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5.4.2 Bid ﬂoors
New regulations in April 2008 introduced a bidding ﬂoor for newly participat-
ing resources and a pivotal supplier test including a must oﬀer of all capacity
for pivotal ﬁrms. The bid ﬂoor was implemented at 0.75 times of the esti-
mated net cost of entry (Net Cone). All new built capacity participating for
the ﬁrst time had to bid above this ﬂoor. The bid ﬂoor was introduced to
prevent uneconomic entry. Opposing to the NYISO regulations, this counter-
factual assumes that a bid ﬂoor is implemented for all participating units. A
bid ﬂoor for all capacity bids can change the equilibrium price if the bid ﬂoor
is higher than at least one bound derived in equation (4). Firms are forced
to bid higher and it becomes proﬁtable to undercut for the pivotal ﬁrm. In
this way a bid ﬂoor can lower the equilibrium price. For the counterfactual I
use a bid ﬂoor of 0.75 times Net Cone like it is required for the new resources
that entered the market after April 2008. The results show that under this
bid ﬂoor regime the pivotal ﬁrm would have proﬁtably undercut and the
equilibrium price would have been lower for 12 out of 56 auctions. When the
pivotal ﬁrm undercuts and also prices at the bid ﬂoor, the ISO can eﬀectively
use a well adjusted bid ﬂoor to lower the market price. Generally the ISO
faces a trade-oﬀ between the frequency and the amount of price reductions.
If the bid ﬂoor is too low, the equilibria as described in equations (3) and (4)
are still feasible. If the bid ﬂoor is too high, the market price becomes higher
than without the bid ﬂoor. Calculations using a bid ﬂoor of only 0.5 times
Net Cone show that then the outcome of only 7 auctions would change, but
therefore yielding lower auction prices.
zero. One possibility is that the pivotal bidder did not sell enough capacity on the forward
market and submitted all remaining capacity to the spot auction.
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6 Conclusion
This paper developed a simple multiunit uniform price auction model and
applied it to data from the NYISO capacity auctions. The results show that
the model describes the behavior in the auction to a high degree. The pivotal
bidder oﬀers the largest capacity and submits the clearing price in each auc-
tion. In this way the ﬁrms co-ordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high
rents from the auctioneer. Modeled bounds for inframaginal bids describe
around 95% of the observed bid patterns. Where bounds were violated and
bids could have proﬁtably been undercut by the pivotal ﬁrm, bidders seem to
learn over time. A majority of bids that could have been proﬁtably underbid
were submitted in the ﬁrst ﬁve auctions, and the magnitude of non-optimal
low bids decreases after the ﬁrst ﬁve auctions. Inframarginal ﬁrms reacted to
the pivotal ﬁrm’s proﬁts and its proﬁts of undercutting by adjusting their in-
framarginal bids. During the period studied from 2003 to 2008, the capacity
market in New York did not clear as intended and was rewarding capacity at
too high prices. Capacity markets, if designed in the form studied here, are a
costly tool to overcome the problem of supply security and supply adequacy
in electricity markets. Counterfactual calculations show that bid ﬂoors have
the potential to lower capacity market prices.
A Appendix
A.1 Capacity oﬀers by inframarginal bidders
I derive a limit on the optimal aggregate capacity submitted by all inframarginal bidders,
Km−1. The residual monopoly price that optimizes equation (3) can be rewritten as
min{a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d , b
cap}, where bcap is the bid cap and a and d are demand at a price of
zero and the demand slope respectively. Proﬁts of inframarginal ﬁrms become πi =m =
min{a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d , b
cap}ki. If the bid cap is not binding, min{a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d , b
cap} = a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d ,
taking the F.O.C with respect to ki,
∂πi=m
∂ki
, yields k∗i = a −
∑m−1
i=1 ki. Summing up all
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optimal capacity oﬀers of each ﬁrm i and assuming symmetry of low bidding ﬁrms we
arrive at an aggregate optimal capacity oﬀer of all inframarginal ﬁrms of
∑m−1
i=1 ki =
(m−1)a
m , which is increasing in m. Observing less aggregate capacity by inframarginal
bidders in one auction means that each bidder could have gained by increasing its capacity
oﬀer and hence must be constrained. If the pivotal ﬁrm is constrained by the bid cap,
min{a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d , b
cap} = bcap, the limit on the optimal aggregate inframarginal capacity
can be found by solving a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d = b
cap, which yields
∑m−1
i=1 ki = a − 2dbcap. The bid
cap increases the optimal aggregate inframarginal capacity until the residual monopoly
price equals the price cap.
A.2 Equilibria in wich the largest ﬁrm is pivotal
All equilibria in which the largest ﬁrm is the pivotal bidder and all smaller ﬁrms bid
inbetween zero and their bound always exist, because smaller ﬁrms never have an incentive
to overbid the pivotal ﬁrm. If small bidders overbid, the largest bidder will be among
the inframarginal bidders and aggregate inframarginal capacity increases. This results in
a lower residual demand for the overbidding small ﬁrm, than the residual demand the
largest ﬁrm was facing. The auction price decreases, compared to the situation in which
the largest ﬁrm is pivotal. Hence, all smaller ﬁrms always sell all their capacity at the
highest possible price, when being among the low bidders. Overbidding the pivotal and
largest ﬁrm decreases the auction price, and potentially also the sold quantity for the
overbidding small ﬁrm.
A.3 Conditions for the largest ﬁrm to be pivotal
When ﬁrm sizes are suﬃciently asymmetric, the multiplicity of equilibria in the auction
outcome reduces to a smaller set of equilibria, in which the largest ﬁrm is the pivotal
bidder and all smaller ﬁrms submit bids between zero and their upper bounds. Suppose
all but the largest ﬁrms have an aggregate capacity of Km−1, while the largest pivotal
bidder has a capacity of km. If km is suﬃciently larger than the sum of all the small ﬁrms’
capacities Km−1, the large ﬁrm always would like to overbid smaller pivotal bidders and
maximize its proﬁts by submitting the market clearing high bid. To see this, note that
the simple residual monopoly price is a−Km−12d , where a is the demand at a price of zero
and d is the demand slope. Residual monopoly proﬁts of the large ﬁrm can be derived
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as (a−Km−1)
2
4d . When not being the pivotal bidder but among the low bidders, the largest
ﬁrm can earn the highest proﬁts when beeing the lowest bidder, and leaving the highest
possible residual demand for smaller and auction clearing ﬁrms. These highest proﬁts for
the large ﬁrm, when being inframarginal, are the proﬁts when the next highest bid by a
smaller ﬁrm is alrady the pivotal bid. In this case the large ﬁrm earns proﬁts of a−km2d km.
Hence, for a−km2d km <
(a−Km−1)2
4d , the largest ﬁrm will always overbid all smaller pivotal
bidders. Rearranging yields the suﬃcient but not neccessary condition of ﬁrm sizes for
which the largest player would never be among the low bidders. For all km and Km−1
that satisfy
Km−1 ≤
√
2(a− km)km (9)
there is only one set of equilibria in which the largest ﬁrm with capacity km is the pivotal
bidder.
When the bid cap is binding for the pivotal ﬁrm, min{a−
∑m−1
i=1 ki
2d , b
cap} = bcap, condition
(9) changes. Proﬁts of the pivotal ﬁrm m are now (D(bcap)−Km−1)bcap, while if among
the low bidders, with a similar reasoning as above, proﬁts are at most min{a−km2d , bcap}km.
Whenever min{a−km2d , bcap} = bcap, and we compare pivotal and low bidding proﬁts,
(D(bcap) − Km−1)bcap = bcapkm, the largest ﬁrm never wants to overbid and become
pivotal when being among the low bidders, unless D(bcap) − Km−1 > km holds and the
auction does not clear. When however min{a−km2d , bcap} = a−km2d , what happens as long as
km > a− 2dbcap, (10)
we compare pivotal and low bidding proﬁts (D(bcap) − Km−1)bcap = a−km2d km and ﬁnd
that as long as
Km−1 < D(bcap)− a− km2dbcap km (11)
holds, the largest ﬁrm always wants to be the pivotal bidder. Hence, whenever the price
cap is not binding and condition (9) holds, or whenever the price cap is binding for the
largest ﬁrm when being pivotal and conditions (10) and (11) hold, there is only one set of
equilibria in which the largest ﬁrm with capacity km is the pivotal bidder.
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B Tables
Table 1: Model for equation (6) with bid bound ratio larger than 0.7.
(1)
ln(bIIj )
ln(πm) 0.750∗∗∗
(30.16)
ln (D(bj)−Kj−1) -0.699∗∗∗
(-12.01)
ln(p(0)) 0.0276
(0.77)
cons 0.180
(0.68)
N 133
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Conclusion
Conclusion
Security of supply in electricity markets is determined by power generating
ﬁrms who decide on prices and production capacities while facing stochastic
demand and intermittent production technologies. This dissertation consists
of three chapters that each deal with the eﬀects of market design on the
ﬁrms’ decision to produce and the consumers’ choice to consume electricity,
and how their actions combine to determine security of supply.
The ﬁrst chapter asks to what extent a duopolistic power market can solve
eﬃciency and supply security requirements. I show that in a duopoly market
the wholesale auction is characterized by prices above marginal costs and
that blackout probabilities can arise through capacity withholding rather
than capacity scarcity. In equilibrium, one larger ﬁrm prices higher and
sells power at the margin, while the smaller ﬁrm bids lower energy prices
and withholds inframarginal capacity. Only the larger ﬁrm has an incentive
to maintain balanced grids and supply all stochastic demand. The smaller
ﬁrm risks blackouts when maximizing proﬁts. When the system operator
faces high demand that leads to a shortage of supply, and thus has to buy
more energy, the smaller ﬁrm then becomes a monopolist for out of market
purchases.
Then I analyze how markets can be designed to support secure supply and
minimize blackouts through bid based capacity remuneration mechanisms.
When regulators implement capacity remuneration mechanisms, available
peak capacity increases, however only if capacity is remunerated above its
marginal costs of being available. In that case, capacity mechanisms lower
blackout probabilities, but increase energy price volatility. I ﬁnd that energy
price caps reduce price volatility without eﬀecting system security in the
short run. Hence, energy price caps and capacity mechanisms can mitigate
market power in the energy market, but at high costs for available peak
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capacity. The choice of market design depends on regulatory preferences for
supply security. That is, on how much costs regulators are willing to spend
for secure supply and on how far regulators are willing to administer capacity
mechanisms that distort energy price signals in the long run.
The second chapter analyzes how smart metering can soften the market de-
sign problem as discussed in the ﬁrst chapter and increase market eﬃciency.
The focus of the analysis lies on welfare eﬀects of smart metering when con-
sumers are risk-averse and generating ﬁrms have market power. Whether
real-time pricing enhances welfare depends on the ﬁrms’ capacities, the mag-
nitude of the demand shock and on the proportion of consumers on real-time
pricing schemes. With large ﬁrm capacities that always lead to Bertrand
prices, there is no diﬀerence in welfare when all or no consumers are on real-
time pricing. When ﬁrms’ capacities are smaller such that market power
arises, ﬁrms can price relatively high in times of high demand shocks. When
this is the case, real-time pricing decreases consumer surplus, because risk
averse consumers dislike high and uncertain prices. At the same time real-
time pricing increases producer surplus, because more wholesale customers
pay a real-time price above marginal costs. These two opposing eﬀects lead
to a U-shaped welfare in smart metering whenever the demand shock can
change the equilibrium price. If however ﬁrms’ capacities are relatively large
and the demand shock does not change the wholesale price, smart meter-
ing can increase consumer surplus and welfare. The ﬁndings suggest that,
before investing in smart meters and smart grids, aggregate market capaci-
ties, dominant ﬁrm behavior, and the welfare gain of insuring against price
ﬂuctuations through ﬁxed retail prices should be taken into consideration.
The last chapter takes the market design discussion to data. I develop a
simple multiunit uniform price auction model and apply it to data from the
New York ISO capacity auctions. The results show that the simple model
describes the behavior in the auction to a high degree. As predicted by the
model, the pivotal bidder oﬀers the largest amount of capacity and submits
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the clearing price in each auction. In this way the ﬁrms co-ordinate on an
equilibrium that extracts high rents from the auctioneer. Where observed
bids violated the model and could have proﬁtably been undercut by the piv-
otal ﬁrm, bidders seem to learn over time. A majority of bids that according
to the model could have been proﬁtably underbid were submitted in the
ﬁrst ﬁve auctions, and the magnitude of non-optimal inframarginal bids de-
creases thereafter. Small ﬁrms adjusted their bids according to the largest
ﬁrm’s proﬁts of undercutting, thereby making undercutting not proﬁtable.
During the period studied from 2003 to 2008, the capacity market in New
York did not clear as intended by the system operator and was rewarding
capacity at too high prices. Capacity remuneration mechanisms, if designed
in the form of the capacity auctions studied here, are a costly tool to promote
supply security and supply adequacy in electricity markets.
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